The Memorabilia

BOOK III

I

Aspirants to honour and distinction (1) derived similar help from Socrates, who in each case stimulated in them a persevering assiduity towards their several aims, as the following narratives tend to show. He had heard on one occasion of the arrival in Athens of Dionysodorus, (2) who professed to teach the whole duty of a general. (3) Accordingly he remarked to one of those who were with him—a young man whose anxiety to obtain the office of Strategos (4) was no secret to him:

 (1) {ton kalon} = everything which the {kalos te kagathos} should aim     at, but especially the honourable offices of state such as the     Archonship, Strategia, Hipparchia, etc. See Plat.  "Laches."  (2) Dionysodorus of Chios, presumably.  See Plat.  "Euthyd."  271 C foll.  (3) A professor of the science and art of strategy.  (4) Lit.  "that honour," sc.  the Strategia.   

Soc. It would be monstrous on the part of any one who sought to become a general (5) to throw away the slightest opportunity of learning the duties of the office. Such a person, I should say, would deserve to be fined and punished by the state far more than the charlatan who without having learnt the art of a sculptor undertakes a contract to carve a statue. Considering that the whole fortunes of the state are entrusted to the general during a war, with all its incidental peril, it is only reasonable to anticipate that great blessings or great misfortunes will result in proportion to the success or bungling of that officer. I appeal to you, young sir, do you not agree that a candidate who, while taking pains to be elected neglects to learn the duties of the office, would richly deserve to be fined?

 (5) i.e.  "head of the war department, and commander-in-chief," etc. 

With arguments like these he persuaded the young man to go and take lessons. After he had gone through the course he came back, and Socrates proceeded playfully to banter him.

Soc. Behold our young friend, sirs, as Homer says of Agamemnon, of mein majestical, (6) so he; does he not seem to move more majestically, like one who has studied to be a general? Of course, just as a man who has learned to play the harp is a harper, even if he never touch the instrument, or as one who has studied medicine is a physician, though he does not practise, so our friend here from this time forward is now and ever shall be a general, even though he does not receive a vote at the elections. But the dunce who has not the science is neither general nor doctor, no, not even if the whole world appointed him. But (he proceeded, turning to the youth), in case any of us should ever find ourselves captain or colonel (7) under you, to give us some smattering of the science of war, what did the professor take as the starting-point of his instruction in generalship? Please inform us.

 (6) "Il."  iii.  169, 170.  (7) Or, "brigadier or captain," lit.  taxiarch or lochagos.   

Then the young man: He began where he ended; he taught me tactics (8)—tactics and nothing else.

 (8) Cf.  "Cyrop."  I.  vi.  12 foll.  ; VIII.  v.  15.   

Yet surely (replied Socrates) that is only an infinitesimal part of generalship. A general (9) must be ready in furnishing the material of war: in providing the commissariat for his troops; quick in devices, he must be full of practical resource; nothing must escape his eye or tax his endurance; he must be shrewd, and ready of wit, a combination at once of clemency and fierceness, of simplicity and of insidious craft; he must play the part of watchman, of robber; now prodigal as a spendthrift, and again close-fisted as a miser, the bounty of his munificence must be equalled by the narrowness of his greed; impregnable in defence, a very dare-devil in attack—these and many other qualities must he possess who is to make a good general and minister of war; they must come to him by gift of nature or through science. No doubt it is a grand thing also to be a tactician, since there is all the difference in the world between an army properly handled in the field and the same in disorder; just as stones and bricks, woodwork and tiles, tumbled together in a heap are of no use at all, but arrange them in a certain order—at bottom and atop materials which will not crumble or rot, such as stones and earthen tiles, and in the middle between the two put bricks and woodwork, with an eye to architectural principle, (10) and finally you get a valuable possession—to wit, a dwelling-place.

 (9) A strategos.  For the duties and spheres of action of this officer,     see Gow, op.  cit.  xiv.  58.  (10) "As in the building of a house."  See Vitrivius, ii.  3; Plin.  xxv.  14.   

The simile is very apt, Socrates (11) (replied the youth), for in battle, too, the rule is to draw up the best men in front and rear, with those of inferior quality between, where they may be led on by the former and pushed on by the hinder.

 (11) Cf.  "Il."  iv.  297 foll.  ; "Cyrop."  VI.  iii.  25; Polyb.  x.  22.   

Soc. Very good, no doubt, if the professor taught you to distinguish good and bad; but if not, where is the use of your learning? It would scarcely help you, would it, to be told to arrange coins in piles, the best coins at top and bottom and the worst in the middle, unless you were first taught to distinguish real from counterfeit.

The Youth. Well no, upon my word, he did not teach us that, so that the task of distinguishing between good and bad must devolve on ourselves.

Soc. Well, shall we see, then, how we may best avoid making blunders between them?

I am ready (replied the youth).

Soc. Well then! Let us suppose we are marauders, and the task imposed upon us is to carry off some bullion; it will be a right disposition of our forces if we place in the vanguard those who are the greediest of gain? (12)

 (12) "Whose fingers itch for gold."   

The Youth. I should think so.

Soc. Then what if there is danger to be faced? Shall the vanguard consist of men who are greediest of honour?

The Youth. It is these, at any rate, who will face danger for the sake of praise and glory. (13) Fortunately such people are not hid away in a corner; they shine forth conspicuous everywhere, and are easy to be discovered.

 (13) Cf.  Shakesp.  "seeking the bubble reputation even in the cannon's     mouth."   

Soc. But tell me, did he teach you how to draw up troops in general, or specifically where and how to apply each particular kind of tactical arrangement?

The Youth. Nothing of the sort.

Soc. And yet there are and must be innumerable circumstances in which the same ordering of march or battle will be out of place.

The Youth. I assure you he did not draw any of these fine distinctions.

He did not, did not he? (he answered). Bless me! Go back to him again, then, and ply him with questions; if he really has the science, and is not lost to all sense of shame, he will blush to have taken your money and then to have sent you away empty.

II

At another time he fell in with a man who had been chosen general and minister of war, and thus accosted him.

Soc. Why did Homer, think you, designate Agamemnon "shepherd of the peoples"? (1) Was it possibly to show that, even as a shepherd must care for his sheep and see that they are safe and have all things needful, and that the objects of their rearing be secured, so also must a general take care that his soldiers are safe and have their supplies, and attain the objects of their soldiering? Which last is that they may get the mastery of their enemies, and so add to their own good fortune and happiness; or tell me, what made him praise Agamemnon, saying—

    He is both a good king and a warrior bold?     (2) 

Did he mean, perhaps, to imply that he would be a 'warrior bold,' not merely in standing alone and bravely battling against the foe, but as inspiring the whole of his host with like prowess; and by a 'good king,' not merely one who should stand forth gallantly to protect his own life, but who should be the source of happiness to all over whom he reigns? Since a man is not chosen king in order to take heed to himself, albeit nobly, but that those who chose him may attain to happiness through him. And why do men go soldiering except to ameliorate existence? (3) and to this end they choose their generals that they may find in them guides to the goal in question. He, then, who undertakes that office is bound to procure for those who choose him the thing they seek for. And indeed it were not easy to find any nobler ambition than this, or aught ignobler than its opposite.

 (1) "Il."  ii.  243.  "The People's Paster," Chapman.  (2) "Il."  iii.  179; cf.  "Symp."  iv.  6.  A favourite line of Alexander     the Great's, it is said.  (3) Of, "that life may reach some flower of happiness."   

After such sort he handled the question, what is the virtue of a good leader? and by shredding off all superficial qualities, laid bare as the kernel of the matter that it is the function of every leader to make those happy whom he may be called upon to lead. (4)

 (4) Cf.  Plat.  "Rep."  342.   

III

The following conversation with a youth who had just been elected hipparch (1) (or commandant of cavalry), I can also vouch for. (2)

 (1) Cf.  "Hipparch."  (2) Lit.  "I know he once held."   

Soc. Can you tell us what set you wishing to be a general of cavalry, young sir? What was your object? I suppose it was not simply to ride at the head of the "knights," an honour not denied to the mounted archers, (3) who ride even in front of the generals themselves?

 (3) Lit.  "Hippotoxotai."  See Boeckh, "P.  E.  A."  II.  xxi.  p.  264 (Eng.  tr.)   

Hipp. You are right.

Soc. No more was it for the sake merely of public notoriety, since a madman might boast of that fatal distinction. (4)

 (4) Or, "as we all know, 'Tom Fool' can boast," etc. 

Hipp. You are right again.

Soc. Is this possibly the explanation? you think to improve the cavalry—your aim would be to hand it over to the state in better condition than you find it; and, if the cavalry chanced to be called out, you at their head would be the cause of some good thing to Athens?

Hipp. Most certainly.

Soc. Well, and a noble ambition too, upon my word—if you can achieve your object. The command to which you are appointed concerns horses and riders, does it not?

Hipp. It does, no doubt.

Soc. Come then, will you explain to us first how you propose to improve the horses.

Hipp. Ah, that will scarcely form part of my business, I fancy. Each trooper is personally responsible for the condition of his horse.

Soc. But suppose, when they present themselves and their horses, (5) you find that some have brought beasts with bad feet or legs or otherwise infirm, and others such ill-fed jades that they cannot keep up on the march; others, again, brutes so ill broken and unmanageable that they will not keep their place in the ranks, and others such desperate plungers that they cannot be got to any place in the ranks at all. What becomes of your cavalry force then? How will you charge at the head of such a troop, and win glory for the state?

 (5) For this phrase, see Schneider and Kuhner ad loc.   

Hipp. You are right. I will try to look after the horses to my utmost.

Soc. Well, and will you not lay your hand to improve the men themselves?

Hipp. I will.

Soc. The first thing will be to make them expert in mounting their chargers?

Hipp. That certainly, for if any of them were dismounted he would then have a better chance of saving himself.

Soc. Well, but when it comes to the hazard of engagement, what will you do then? Give orders to draw the enemy down to the sandy ground (6) where you are accustomed to manouvre, or endeavour beforehand to put your men through their practice on ground resembling a real battlefield?

 (6) e.g.  the hippodrome at Phaleron.   

Hipp. That would be better, no doubt.

Soc. Well, shall you regard it as a part of your duty to see that as many of your men as possible can take aim and shoot on horseback? (7)

 (7) Cf.  "Hipparch," i.  21.   

Hipp. It will be better, certainly.

Soc. And have you thought how to whet the courage of your troopers? to kindle in them rage to meet the enemy? —which things are but stimulants to make stout hearts stouter?

Hipp. If I have not done so hitherto, I will try to make up for lost time now.

Soc. And have you troubled your head at all to consider how you are to secure the obedience of your men? for without that not one particle of good will you get, for all your horses and troopers so brave and so stout.

Hipp. That is a true saying; but how, Socrates, should a man best bring them to this virtue? (8)

 (8) {protrepsasthai}.  See above, I.  ii.  64; below, IV.  v.  1.   

Soc. I presume you know that in any business whatever, people are more apt to follow the lead of those whom they look upon as adepts; thus in case of sickness they are readiest to obey him whom they regard as the cleverest physician; and so on a voyage the most skilful pilot; in matters agricultural the best farmer, and so forth.

Hipp. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Then in this matter of cavalry also we may reasonably suppose that he who is looked upon as knowing his business best will command the readiest obedience.

Hipp. If, then, I can prove to my troopers that I am better than all of them, will that suffice to win their obedience?

Soc. Yes, if along with that you can teach them that obedience to you brings greater glory and surer safety to themselves.

Hipp. How am I to teach them that?

Soc. Upon my word! How are you to teach them that? Far more easily, I take it, than if you had to teach them that bad things are better than good, and more advantageous to boot.

Hipp. I suppose you mean that, besides his other qualifications a commandant of cavalry must have command of speech and argument? (9)

 (9) Or, "practise the art of oratory"; "express himself clearly and     rationally."  See Grote, "H.  G."  VIII.  lxvii.  p.  463 note;     "Hipparch," i.  24; viii.  22.   

Soc. Were you under the impression that the commandant was not to open his mouth? Did it never occur to you that all the noblest things which custom (10) compels us to learn, and to which indeed we owe our knowledge of life, have all been learned by means of speech (11) and reason; and if there be any other noble learning which a man may learn, it is this same reason whereby he learns it; and the best teachers are those who have the freest command of thought and language, and those that have the best knowledge of the most serious things are the most brilliant masters of disputation. Again, have you not observed that whenever this city of ours fits out one of her choruses—such as that, for instance, which is sent to Delos (12)—there is nothing elsewhere from any quarter of the world which can compete with it; nor will you find in any other state collected so fair a flower of manhood as in Athens? (13)

 (10) Cf Arist.  "Rhet."  ii.  12, {oi neoi pepaideuntai upo tou nomou     monon}.  (11) {dia logou}.  (12) See Thuc.  iii.  104; and below, IV.  viii.  2.  (13) See references ap.  Schneider and Kuhner; "Symp."  iv.  17.   

Hipp. You say truly.

Soc. But for all that, it is not in sweetness of voice that the Athenians differ from the rest of the world so much, nor in stature of body or strength of limb, but in ambition and that love of honour (14) which most of all gives a keen edge to the spirit in the pursuit of things lovely and of high esteem.

 (14) See below, v.  3; Dem.  "de Cor."  28 foll.   

Hipp. That, too, is a true saying.

Soc. Do you not think, then, that if a man devoted himself to our cavalry also, here in Athens, we should far outstrip the rest of the world, whether in the furnishing of arms and horses, or in orderliness of battle-array, or in eager hazardous encounter with the foe, if only we could persuade ourselves that by so doing we should obtain honour and distinction?

Hipp. It is reasonable to think so.

Soc. Have no hesitation, therefore, but try to guide your men into this path, (15) whence you yourself, and through you your fellow-citizens, will reap advantage.

 (15) Or, "to conduct which will not certainly fail of profit to     yourself or through you to..."   

Yes, in good sooth, I will try (he answered).

IV

At another time, seeing Nicomachides on his way back from the elections (of magistrates), (1) he asked him: Who are elected generals, Nicomachides?

 (1) Cf.  "Pol.  Ath."  i.  3; Aristot.  "Ath.  Pol."  44.  4; and Dr. Sandys'     note ad loc.  p.  165 of his edition.   

And he: Is it not just like them, these citizens of Athens—just like them, I say—to go and elect, not me, who ever since my name first appeared on the muster-roll have literally worn myself out with military service—now as a captain, now as a colonel—and have received all these wounds from the enemy, look you! (at the same time, and suiting the action to the word, he bared his arms and proceeded to show the scars of ancient wounds)—they elect not me (he went on), but, if you please, Antisthenes! who never served as a hoplite (2) in his life nor in the cavalry ever made a brilliant stroke, that I ever heard tell of; no! in fact, he has got no science at all, I take it, except to amass stores of wealth.

 (2) Cf.  Lys.  xiv.  10.   

But still (returned Socrates), surely that is one point in his favour—he ought to be able to provide the troops with supplies.

Nic. Well, for the matter of that, merchants are good hands at collecting stores; but it does not follow that a merchant or trader will be able to command an army.

But (rejoined Socrates) Antisthenes is a man of great pertinacity, who insists on winning, and that is a very necessary quality in a general. (3) Do not you see how each time he has been choragos (4) he has been successful with one chorus after another?

 (3) See Grote, "Plato," i.  465 foll.  (4) Choir-master, or Director of the Chorus.  It was his duty to     provide and preside over a chorus to sing, dance, or play at any     of the public festivals, defraying the cost as a state service of     {leitourgia}.  See "Pol.  Ath."  iii.  4; "Hiero," ix.  4; Aristot.  "Pol.  Ath."  28.  3.   

Nic. Bless me! yes; but there is a wide difference between standing at the head of a band of singers and dancers and a troop of soldiers.

Soc. Still, without any practical skill in singing or in the training of a chorus, Antisthenes somehow had the art to select the greatest proficients in both.

Nic. Yes, and by the same reasoning we are to infer that on a campaign he will find proficients, some to marshal the troops for him and others to fight his battles?

Soc. Just so. If in matters military he only exhibits the same skill in selecting the best hands as he has shown in matters of the chorus, it is highly probable he will here also bear away the palm of victory; and we may presume that if he expended so much to win a choric victory with a single tribe, (5) he will be ready to expend more to secure a victory in war with the whole state to back him.

 (5) See Dem.  "against Lept."  496.  26.  Each tribe nominated such of its     members as were qualified to undertake the burden.   

Nic. Do you really mean, Socrates, that it is the function of the same man to provide efficient choruses and to act as commander-in-chief?

Soc. I mean this, that, given a man knows what he needs to provide, and has the skill to do so, no matter what the department of things may be—house or city or army—you will find him a good chief and director (6) of the same.

 (6) Or, "representative."   

Then Nicomachides: Upon my word, Socrates, I should never have expected to hear you say that a good housekeeper (7) and steward of an estate would make a good general.

 (7) Or, "economist"; cf.  "Cyrop."  I.  vi.  12.   

Soc. Come then, suppose we examine their respective duties, and so determine (8) whether they are the same or different.

 (8) Lit.  "get to know."   

Nic. Let us do so.

Soc. Well then, is it not a common duty of both to procure the ready obedience of those under them to their orders?

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. And also to assign to those best qualified to perform them their distinctive tasks?

That, too, belongs to both alike (he answered).

Soc. Again, to chastise the bad and reward the good belongs to both alike, methinks?

Nic. Decidedly.

Soc. And to win the kindly feeling of their subordinates must surely be the noble ambition of both?

That too (he answered).

Soc. And do you consider it to the interest of both alike to win the adherence of supporters and allies? (9)

 (9) In reference to the necessity of building up a family connection     or political alliances cf.  Arist.  "Pol."  iii.  9, 13.   

Nic. Without a doubt.

Soc. And does it not closely concern them both to be good guardians of their respective charges?

Nic. Very much so.

Soc. Then it equally concerns them both to be painstaking and prodigal of toil in all their doings?

Nic. Yes, all these duties belong to both alike, but the parallel ends when you come to actual fighting.

Soc. Yet they are both sure to meet with enemies?

Nic. There is no doubt about that.

Soc. Then is it not to the interest of both to get the upper hand of these?

Nic. Certainly; but you omit to tell us what service organisation and the art of management will render when it comes to actual fighting.

Soc. Why, it is just then, I presume, it will be of most service, for the good economist knows that nothing is so advantageous or so lucrative as victory in battle, or to put it negatively, nothing so disastrous and expensive as defeat. He will enthusiastically seek out and provide everything conducive to victory, he will painstakingly discover and guard against all that tends to defeat, and when satisfied that all is ready and ripe for victory he will deliver battle energetically, and what is equally important, until the hour of final preparation has arrived, (10) he will be cautious to deliver battle. Do not despise men of economic genius, Nicomachides; the difference between the devotion requisite to private affairs and to affairs of state is merely one of quantity. For the rest the parallel holds strictly, and in this respect pre-eminently, that both are concerned with human instruments: which human beings, moreover, are of one type and temperament, whether we speak of devotion to public affairs or of the administration of private property. To fare well in either case is given to those who know the secret of dealing with humanity, whereas the absence of that knowledge will as certainly imply in either case a fatal note of discord. (11)

 (10) Lit.  "as long as he is unprepared."  (11) L.  Dindorf, "Index Graec."  Ox.  ed.  ; cf.  Hor.  "Ep."  II.  ii.  144,     "sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae," "the harmony of     life," Conington.   

V

A conversation held with Pericles the son of the great statesman may here be introduced. (1) Socrates began:

 (1) Or, "On one occasion Pericles was the person addressed in     conversation."  For Pericles see "Hell."  I.  v.  16; vii.  15; Plut.  "Pericl."  37 (Clough, i.  368).   

I am looking forward, I must tell you, Pericles, to a great improvement in our military affairs when you are minister of war. (2) The prestige of Athens, I hope, will rise; we shall gain the mastery over our enemies.

 (2) "Strategos."   

Pericles replied: I devoutly wish your words might be fulfilled, but how this happy result is to be obtained, I am at a loss to discover.

Shall we (Socrates continued), shall we balance the arguments for and against, and consider to what extent the possibility does exist?

Pray let us do so (he answered).

Soc. Well then, you know that in point of numbers the Athenians are not inferior to the Boeotians?

Per. Yes, I am aware of that.

Soc. And do you think the Boeotians could furnish a better pick of fine healthy men than the Athenians?

Per. I think we should very well hold our own in that respect.

Soc. And which of the two would you take to be the more united people—the friendlier among themselves?

Per. The Athenians, I should say, for so many sections of the Boeotians, resenting the selfish policy (3) of Thebes, are ill disposed to that power, but at Athens I see nothing of the sort.

 (3) "The self-aggrandisement."   

Soc. But perhaps you will say that there is no people more jealous of honour or haughtier in spirit. (4) And these feelings are no weak spurs to quicken even a dull spirit to hazard all for glory's sake and fatherland.

 (4) Reading {megalophronestatoi}, after Cobet.  See "Hipparch," vii.  3;     or if as vulg.  {philophronestatoi}, transl.  "more affable."   

Per. Nor is there much fault to find with Athenians in these respects.

Soc. And if we turn to consider the fair deeds of ancestry, (5) to no people besides ourselves belongs so rich a heritage of stimulating memories, whereby so many of us are stirred to pursue virtue with devotion and to show ourselves in our turn also men of valour like our sires.

 (5) See Wesley's anthem, Eccles.  xliv.  1, "Let us now praise famous     men and our fathers that begat us."   

Per. All that you say, Socrates, is most true, but do you observe that ever since the disaster of the thousand under Tolmides at Lebadeia, coupled with that under Hippocrates at Delium, (6) the prestige of Athens by comparison with the Boeotians has been lowered, whilst the spirit of Thebes as against Athens had been correspondingly exalted, so that those Boeotians who in old days did not venture to give battle to the Athenians even in their own territory unless they had the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the Peloponnesians to help them, do nowadays threaten to make an incursion into Attica single-handed; and the Athenians, who formerly, if they had to deal with the Boeotians (7) only, made havoc of their territory, are now afraid the Boeotians may some day harry Attica.

 (6) Lebadeia, 447 B.  C.  ; Delium, 424 B.  C.  For Tolmides and Hippocrates     see Thuc.  i.  113; iv.  100 foll.  ; Grote, "H.  G."  v.  471; vi.  533.  (7) Reading {ote B.  monoi}, al.  {ou monoi}, "when the Boeotians were     not unaided."   

To which Socrates: Yes, I perceive that this is so, but it seems to me that the state was never more tractably disposed, never so ripe for a really good leader, as to-day. For if boldness be the parent of carelessness, laxity, and insubordination, it is the part of fear to make people more disposed to application, obedience, and good order. A proof of which you may discover in the behaviour of people on ship-board. It is in seasons of calm weather when there is nothing to fear that disorder may be said to reign, but as soon as there is apprehension of a storm, or an enemy in sight, the scene changes; not only is each word of command obeyed, but there is a hush of silent expectation; the mariners wait to catch the next signal like an orchestra with eyes upon the leader.

Per. But indeed, given that now is the opportunity to take obedience at the flood, it is high time also to explain by what means we are to rekindle in the hearts of our countrymen (8) the old fires—the passionate longing for antique valour, for the glory and the wellbeing of the days of old.

 (8) Reading {anerasthenai}, Schneider's emendation of the vulg.  {aneristhenai}.   

Well (proceeded Socrates), supposing we wished them to lay claim to certain material wealth now held by others, we could not better stimulate them to lay hands on the objects coveted than by showing them that these were ancestral possessions (9) to which they had a natural right. But since our object is that they should set their hearts on virtuous pre-eminence, we must prove to them that such headship combined with virtue is an old time-honoured heritage which pertains to them beyond all others, and that if they strive earnestly after it they will soon out-top the world.

 (9) Cf.  Solon in the matter of Salamis, Plut.  "Sol."  8; Bergk.  "Poet.  Lyr.  Gr.  Solon," SALAMIS, i.  2, 3.   

Por. How are we to inculcate this lesson?

Soc. I think by reminding them of a fact already registered in their minds, (10) that the oldest of our ancestors whose names are known to us were also the bravest of heroes.

 (10) Or, "to which their ears are already opened."   

Per. I suppose you refer to that judgment of the gods which, for their virtue's sake, Cecrops and his followers were called on to decide? (11)

 (11) See Apollodorus, iii.  14.   

Soc. Yes, I refer to that and to the birth and rearing of Erectheus, (12) and also to the war (13) which in his days was waged to stay the tide of invasion from the whole adjoining continent; and that other war in the days of the Heraclidae (14) against the men of Peloponnese; and that series of battles fought in the days of Theseus (15)—in all which the virtuous pre-eminence of our ancestry above the men of their own times was made manifest. Or, if you please, we may come down to things of a later date, which their descendants and the heroes of days not so long anterior to our own wrought in the struggle with the lords of Asia, (16) nay of Europe also, as far as Macedonia: a people possessing a power and means of attack far exceeding any who had gone before—who, moreover, had accomplished the doughtiest deeds. These things the men of Athens wrought partly single-handed, (17) and partly as sharers with the Peloponnesians in laurels won by land and sea. Heroes were these men also, far outshining, as tradition tells us, the peoples of their time.

 (12) Cf.  "Il."  ii.  547, {'Erekhtheos megaletoros k.  t.  l.}  (13) Cf.  Isoc.  "Paneg."  19, who handles all the topics.  (14) Commonly spoken of as "the Return."  See Grote, "H.  G."  II.  ch.  xviii.  (15) Against the Amazons and Thracians; cf.  Herod.  ix.  27; Plut.  "Thes."  27.  (16) The "Persian" wars; cf.  Thucyd.  I.  i.  (17) He omits the Plataeans.   

Per. Yes, so runs the story of their heroism.

Soc. Therefore it is that, amidst the many changes of inhabitants, and the migrations which have, wave after wave, swept over Hellas, these maintained themselves in their own land, unmoved; so that it was a common thing for others to turn to them as to a court of appeal on points of right, or to flee to Athens as a harbour of refuge from the hand of the oppressor. (18)

 (18) Cf.  (Plat.)  "Menex."  ; Isocr.  "Paneg."   

Then Pericles: And the wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came to decline.

Soc. I think we are victims of our own success. Like some athlete, (19) whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians, in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are become degenerate.

 (19) Reading {athletai tines}, or if {alloi tines}, translate "any one     else."   

Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?

Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the institutions of our forefathers—applying them to the regulation of our lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like success; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs to-day, (20) adapting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival their excellence, or, by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim at, rise superior.

 (20) Sc.  the Lacedaemonians.  See W.  L.  Newman, op.  cit.  i.  396.   

You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; (21) as, for instance, when will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, reverence old age—the Athenian, who takes his own father as a starting-point for the contempt he pours upon grey hairs? When will he pay as strict an attention to the body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, (22) but laughs to scorn those who are careful in this matter? When shall we Athenians so obey our magistrates—we who take a pride, as it were, in despising authority? When, once more, shall we be united as a people—we who, instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening each other's characters, (23) envying one another more than we envy all the world besides; and—which is our worst failing—who, in private and public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension and are caught in a maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbour's difficulties rather than to render natural assistance? To make our conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better than if they were the concerns of some foreign state; we make them bones of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hotbed is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly (24) and cowardice, and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear. (25)

 (21) Or, "is far enough away from Athens."  (22) See below, III.  xii.  5; "Pol.  Ath."  i.  13; "Rev."  iv.  52.  (23) Or, "to deal despitefully with one another."  (24) Reading {ateria}.  See L.  Dindorf ad loc.  , Ox.  ed.  lxii.  Al.  {apeiria}, a want of skill, or {ataxia}, disorderliness.  Cf.  "Pol.  Ath."  i.  5.  (25) Possibly the author is thinking of the events of 406, 405 B.  C.  (see "Hell."  I.  vii.  and II.)  , and history may repeat itself.   

Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to believe that Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you not observe their discipline in all naval matters? Look at their prompt and orderly obedience to the superintendents at the gymnastic contests, (26) their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the training of our choruses.

 (26) Epistatoi, i.e.  stewards and training-masters.   

Yes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all those good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens in excellence of manhood, (27) should be so entirely unamenable to discipline.

 (27) {kalokagathia}.   

Then Socrates: Well, but the council which sits on Areopagos is composed of citizens of approved (28) character, is it not?

 (28) Technically, they must have passed the {dokimasia}.  And for the     "Aeropagos" see Grote, "H.  G."  v.  498; Aristot.  "Pol."  ii.  12;     "Ath.  Pol."  4.  4, where see Dr. Sandys' note, p.  18.   

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. Then can you name any similar body, judicial or executive, trying cases or transacting other business with greater honour, stricter legality, higher dignity, or more impartial justice?

No, I have no fault to find on that score (he answered).

Soc. Then we ought not to despair as though all sense of orderliness and good discipline had died out of our countrymen.

Still (he answered), if it is not to harp upon one string, I maintain that in military service, where, if anywhere, sobreity and temperance, orderliness and good discipline are needed, none of these essentials receives any attention.

May it not perhaps be (asked Socrates) that in this department they are officered by those who have the least knowledge? (29) Do you not notice, to take the case of harp-players, choric performers, dancers, and the like, that no one would ever dream of leading if he lacked the requisite knowledge? and the same holds of wrestlers or pancratiasts.

 (29) {episteme}.  See below, III.  ix.  10.   

Moreover, while in these cases any one in command can tell you where he got the elementary knowledge of what he presides over, most generals are amateurs and improvisers. (30) I do not at all suppose that you are one of that sort. I believe you could give as clear an account of your schooling in strategy as you could in the matter of wrestling. No doubt you have got at first hand many of your father's "rules for generalship," which you carefully preserve, besides having collected many others from every quarter whence it was possible to pick up any knowledge which would be of use to a future general. Again, I feel sure you are deeply concerned to escape even unconscious ignorance of anything which will be serviceable to you in so high an office; and if you detect in yourself any ignorance, you turn to those who have knowledge in these matters (sparing neither gifts nor gratitude) to supplement your ignorance by their knowledge and to secure their help.

 (30) Cf.  "Pol.  Lac."  xiii.  5.   

To which Pericles: I am not so blind, Socrates, as to imagine you say these words under the idea that I am truly so careful in these matters; but rather your object is to teach me that the would-be general must make such things his care. I admit in any case all you say.

Socrates proceeded: Has it ever caught your observation, Pericles, that a high mountain barrier stretches like a bulwark in front of our country down towards Boeotia—cleft, moreover, by narrow and precipitous passes, the only avenues into the heart of Attica, which lies engirdled by a ring of natural fortresses? (31)

 (31) The mountains are Cithaeron and Parnes N.  , and Cerata N.  W.   

Per. Certainly I have.

Soc. Well, and have you ever heard tell of the Mysians and Pisidians living within the territory of the great king, (32) who, inside their mountain fortresses, lightly armed, are able to rush down and inflict much injury on the king's territory by their raids, while preserving their own freedom?

 (32) For this illustration see "Anab."  III.  ii.  23; cf.  "Econ."  iv.  18, where Socrates ({XS}) refers to Cyrus's expedition and death.   

Per. Yes, the circumstance is not new to me.

And do you not think (added Socrates) that a corps of young able-bodied Athenians, accoutred with lighter arms, (33) and holding our natural mountain rampart in possession, would prove at once a thorn in the enemy's side offensively, whilst defensively they would form a splendid bulwark to protect the country?

 (33) Cf.  the reforms of Iphicrates.   

To which Pericles: I think, Socrates, these would be all useful measures, decidedly.

If, then (replied Socrates), these suggestions meet your approbation, try, O best of men, to realise them—if you can carry out a portion of them, it will be an honour to yourself and a blessing to the state; while, if you fail in any point, there will be no damage done to the city nor discredit to yourself.

VI

Glaucon, (1) the son of Ariston, had conceived such an ardour to gain the headship of the state that nothing could hinder him but he must deliver a course of public speeches, (2) though he had not yet reached the age of twenty. His friends and relatives tried in vain to stop him making himself ridiculous and being dragged down from the bema. (3) Socrates, who took a kindly interest in the youth for the sake of Charmides (4) the son of Glaucon, and of Plato, alone succeeded in restraining him. It happened thus. He fell in with him, and first of all, to get him to listen, detained him by some such remarks as the following: (5)

 (1) Glaucon, Plato's brother.  Grote, "Plato," i.  508.  (2) "Harangue the People."  (3) See Plat.  "Protag."  319 C: "And if some person offers to give them     advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art      (sc.  of politics), even though he be good-looking, and rich, and     noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh at him, and hoot     him, until he is either clamoured down and retires of himself; or     if he persists, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at     the command of the prytanes" (Jowett).  Cf.  Aristoph.  "Knights,"     665, {kath eilkon auton oi prutaneis kai toxotai}.  (4) For Charmides (maternal uncle of Plato and Glaucon, cousin of     Critias) see ch.  vii.  below; Plato the philosopher, Glaucon's     brother, see Cobet, "Pros.  Xen."  p.  28.  (5) Or, "and in the first instance addressing him in such terms he     could not choose but hear, detained him."  See above, II.  vi.  11.  Socrates applies his own theory.   

Ah, Glaucon (he exclaimed), so you have determined to become prime minister? (6)

 (6) {prostateuein}.   

Glauc. Yes, Socrates, I have.

Soc. And what a noble aim! if aught human ever deserved to be called noble; since if you succeed in your design, it follows, as the night the day, you will be able not only to gratify your every wish, but you will be in a position to benefit your friends, you will raise up your father's house, you will exalt your fatherland, you will become a name thrice famous in the city first, and next in Hellas, and lastly even among barbarians perhaps, like Themistocles; but be it here or be it there, wherever you be, you will be the observed of all beholders. (7)

 (7) "The centre of attraction—the cynosure of neighbouring eyes."   

The heart of Glaucon swelled with pride as he drank in the words, and gladly he stayed to listen.

Presently Socrates proceeded: Then this is clear, Glaucon, is it not? that you must needs benefit the city, since you desire to reap her honours?

Glauc. Undoubtedly.

Then, by all that is sacred (Socrates continued), do not keep us in the dark, but tell us in what way do you propose first to benefit the state? what is your starting-point? (8) When Glaucon remained with sealed lips, as if he were now for the first time debating what this starting-point should be, Socrates continued: I presume, if you wished to improve a friend's estate, you would endeavour to do so by adding to its wealth, would you not? So here, maybe, you will try to add to the wealth of the state?

 (8) Or, "tell us what your starting-point will be in the path of     benefaction."   

Most decidedly (he answered).

Soc. And we may take it the state will grow wealthier in proportion as her revenues increase?

Glauc. That seems probable, at any rate.

Soc. Then would you kindly tell us from what sources the revenues of the state are at present derived, and what is their present magnitude? No doubt you have gone carefully into the question, so that if any of these are failing you may make up the deficit, or if neglected for any reason, make some new provision. (9)

 (9) Or, "or if others have dropped out or been negligently overlooked,     you may replace them."   

Glauc. Nay, to speak the truth, these are matters I have not thoroughly gone into.

Never mind (he said) if you have omitted the point; but you might oblige us by running through the items or heads of expenditure. Obviously you propose to remove all those which are superfluous?

Glauc. Well, no. Upon my word I have not had time to look into that side of the matter either as yet.

Soc. Then we will postpone for the present the problem of making the state wealthier; obviously without knowing the outgoings and the incomings it would be impossible to deal with the matter seriously.

But, Socrates (Glaucon remarked), it is possible to enrich the state out of the pockets of her enemies!

Yes, to be sure, considerably (answered Socrates), in the event of getting the better of them; but in the event of being worsted, it is also possible to lose what we have got.

A true observation (he replied).

And therefore (proceeded Socrates), before he makes up his mind with what enemy to go to war, a statesman should know the relative powers of his own city and the adversary's, so that, in case the superiority be on his own side, he may throw the weight of his advice into the scale of undertaking war; but if the opposite he may plead in favour of exercising caution.

You are right (he answered).

Soc. Then would you for our benefit enumerate the land and naval forces first of Athens and then of our opponents?

Glauc. Pardon me. I could not tell you them off-hand at a moment's notice.

Or (added Socrates), if you have got the figures on paper, you might produce them. I cannot tell how anxious I am to hear your statement.

Glauc. No, I assure you, I have not got them even on paper yet.

Soc. Well then, we will defer tending advice on the topic of peace or war, in a maiden speech at any rate. (10) I can understand that, owing to the magnitude of the questions, in these early days of your ministry you have not yet fully examined them. But come, I am sure that you have studied the defences of the country, at all events, and you know exactly how many forts and outposts are serviceable (11) and how many are not; you can tell us which garrisons are strong enough and which defective; and you are prepared to throw in the weight of your advice in favour of increasing the serviceable outposts and sweeping away those that are superfluous?

 (10) See "Econ."  xi.  1.  (11) Or, "advantageously situated."  See the author's own tract on     "Revenues."   

Glauc. Yes, sweep them all away, that's my advice; for any good that is likely to come of them! Defences indeed! so maintained that the property of the rural districts is simply pilfered.

But suppose you sweep away the outposts (he asked), may not something worse, think you, be the consequence? will not sheer plundering be free to any ruffian who likes?... But may I ask is this judgment the result of personal inspection? have you gone yourself and examined the defences? or how do you know that they are all maintained as you say?

Glauc. I conjecture that it is so.

Soc. Well then, until we have got beyond the region of conjecture shall we defer giving advice on the matter? (It will be time enough when we know the facts.)

Possibly it would be better to wait till then (replied Glaucon).

Soc. Then there are the mines, (12) but, of course, I am aware that you have not visited them in person, so as to be able to say why they are less productive than formerly.

 (12) Again the author's tract on "Revenues" is a comment on the     matter.   

Well, no; I have never been there myself (he answered).

Soc. No, Heaven help us! an unhealthy district by all accounts; so that, when the moment for advice on that topic arrives, you will have an excuse ready to hand.

I see you are making fun of me (Glaucon answered).

Soc. Well, but here is a point, I am sure, which you have not neglected. No, you will have thoroughly gone into it, and you can tell us. For how long a time could the corn supplies from the country districts support the city? how much is requisite for a single year, so that the city may not run short of this prime necessary, before you are well aware; but on the contrary you with your full knowledge will be in a position to give advice on so vital a question, to the aid or may be the salvation of your country?

It is a colossal business this (Glaucon answered), if I am to be obliged to give attention to all these details.

Soc. On the other hand, a man could not even manage his own house or his estate well, without, in the first place, knowing what he requires, and, in the second place, taking pains, item by item, to supply his wants. But since this city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and it is not easy to pay minute attention to so many all at once, how is it you did not practise yourself by trying to augment the resources of one at any rate of these—I mean your own uncle's? The service would not be thrown away. Then if your strength suffices in the single case you might take in hand a larger number; but if you fail to relieve one, how could you possibly hope to succeed with many? How absurd for a man, if he cannot carry half a hundredweight, to attempt to carry a whole! (13)

 (13) Lit.  "a single talent's weight...  to carry two."   

Glauc. Nay, for my part, I am willing enough to assist my uncle's house, if my uncle would only be persuaded to listen to my advice.

Soc. Then, when you cannot persuade your uncle, do you imagine you will be able to make the whole Athenian people, uncle and all, obey you? Be careful, Glaucon (he added), lest in your thirst for glory and high repute you come to the opposite. Do you not see how dangerous it is for a man to speak or act beyond the range (14) of his knowledge? To take the cases known to you of people whose conversation or conduct clearly transcends these limits: should you say they gain more praise or more blame on that account? Are they admired the rather or despised? Or, again, consider those who do know what they say and what they do; and you will find, I venture to say, that in every sort of undertaking those who enjoy repute and admiration belong to the class of those endowed with the highest knowledge; whilst conversely the people of sinister reputation, the mean and the contemptible, emanate from some depth of ignorance and dulness. If therefore what you thirst for is repute and admiration as a statesman, try to make sure of one accomplishment: in other words, the knowledge as far as in you lies of what you wish to do. (15) If, indeed, with this to distinguish you from the rest of the world you venture to concern yourself with state affairs, it would not surprise me but that you might reach the goal of your ambition easily.

 (14) Or, "to talk of things which he does not know, or to meddle with     them."  (15) Or, "try as far as possible to achieve one thing, and that is to     know the business which you propose to carry out."   

VII

Now Charmides, (1) the son of Glaucon, was, as Socrates observed, a man of mark and influence: a much more powerful person in fact than the mass of those devoted to politics at that date, but at the same time he was a man who shrank from approaching the people or busying himself with the concerns of the state. Accordingly Socrates addressed him thus:

 (1) See last chapter for his relationship to Glaucon (the younger) and     Plato; for a conception of his character, Plato's dialogue     "Charmides"; "Theag."  128 E; "Hell."  II.  iv.  19; "Symp."  iv.  31;     Grote, "Plato," i.  480.   

Tell me, Charmides, supposing some one competent to win a victory in the arena and to receive a crown, (2) whereby he will gain honour himself and make the land of his fathers more glorious in Hellas, (3) were to refuse to enter the lists—what kind of person should you set him down to be?

 (2) In some conquest (e.g.  of the Olympic games) where the prize is a     mere wreath.  (3) Cf.  Pindar passim.   

Clearly an effeminate and cowardly fellow (he answered).

Soc. And what if another man, who had it in him, by devotion to affairs of state, to exalt his city and win honour himself thereby, were to shrink and hesitate and hang back—would he too not reasonably be regarded as a coward?

Possibly (he answered); but why do you address these questions to me?

Because (replied Socrates) I think that you, who have this power, do hesitate to devote yourself to matters which, as being a citizen, if for no other reason, you are bound to take part in. (4)

 (4) Or add, "and cannot escape from."   

Charm. And wherein have you detected in me this power, that you pass so severe a sentence upon me?

Soc. I have detected it plainly enough in those gatherings (5) in which you meet the politicians of the day, when, as I observe, each time they consult you on any point you have always good advice to offer, and when they make a blunder you lay your finger on the weak point immediately.

 (5) See above, I.  v.  4; here possibly of political club conversation.   

Charm. To discuss and reason in private is one thing, Socrates, to battle in the throng of the assembly is another.

Soc. And yet a man who can count, counts every bit as well in a crowd as when seated alone by himself; and it is the best performer on the harp in private who carries off the palm of victory in public.

Charm. But do you not see that modesty and timidity are feelings implanted in man's nature? and these are much more powerfully present to us in a crowd than within the circle of our intimates.

Soc. Yes, but what I am bent on teaching you is that while you feel no such bashfulness and timidity before the wisest and strongest of men, you are ashamed of opening your lips in the midst of weaklings and dullards. (6) Is it the fullers among them of whom you stand in awe, or the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the coppersmiths, or the merchants, or the farmers, or the hucksters of the market-place exchanging their wares, and bethinking them how they are to buy this thing cheap, and to sell the other dear—is it before these you are ashamed, for these are the individual atoms out of which the Public Assembly is composed? (7) And what is the difference, pray, between your behaviour and that of a man who, being the superior of trained athletes, quails before a set of amateurs? Is it not the case that you who can argue so readily with the foremost statesmen in the city, some of whom affect to look down upon you—you, with your vast superiority over practised popular debaters—are no sooner confronted with a set of folk who never in their lives gave politics a thought, and into whose heads certainly it never entered to look down upon you—than you are afraid to open your lips in mortal terror of being laughed at?

 (6) Cf.  Cic.  "Tusc."  v.  36, 104; Plat.  "Gorg."  452 E, 454 B.  (7) Cf.  Plat.  "Protag."  319 C.  See W.  L.  Newman, op.  cit.  i.  103.   

Well, but you would admit (he answered) that sound argument does frequently bring down the ridicule of the Popular Assembly.

Soc. Which is equally true of the others. (8) And that is just what rouses my astonishment, that you who can cope so easily with these lordly people (when guilty of ridicule) should persuade yourself that you cannot stand up against a set of commoners. (9) My good fellow, do not be ignorant of yourself! (10) do not fall into that commonest of errors—theirs who rush off to investigate the concerns of the rest of the world, and have no time to turn and examine themselves. Yet that is a duty which you must not in cowardly sort draw back from: rather must you brace ourself to give good heed to your own self; and as to public affairs, if by any manner of means they may be improved through you, do not neglect them. Success in the sphere of politics means that not only the mass of your fellow-citizens, but your personal friends and you yourself last but not least, will profit by your action.

 (8) {oi eteroi}, i.e.  "the foremost statesmen" mentioned before.  Al.  "the opposite party," the "Tories," if one may so say, of the     political clubs.  (9) Lit.  "those...  these."  (10) Ernesti aptly cf.  Cic.  "ad Quint."  iii.  6.  See below, III.  ix.  6;     IV.  ii.  24.   

VIII

Once when Aristippus (1) set himself to subject Socrates to a cross-examination, such as he had himself undergone at the hands of Socrates on a former occasion, (2) Socrates, being minded to benefit those who were with him, gave his answers less in the style of a debater guarding against perversions of his argument, than of a man persuaded of the supreme importance of right conduct. (3)

 (1) For Aristippus see above, p.  38; for the connection, {boulomenos     tous sunontas ophelein}, between this and the preceeding chapter,     see above, Conspectus, p.  xxvi.  (2) Possibly in reference to the conversation above.  In reference to     the present dialogue see Grote, "Plato," I.  xi.  p.  380 foll.  (3) For {prattein ta deonta} cf.  below, III.  ix.  4, 11; Plat.  "Charm."  164 B; but see J.  J.  Hartman, "An.  Xen."  p.  141.   

Aristippus asked him "if he knew of anything good," (4) intending in case he assented and named any particular good thing, like food or drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, to point out that the thing named was sometimes bad. But he, knowing that if a thing troubles us, we immediately want that which will put an end to our trouble, answered precisely as it was best to do. (5)

 (4) See Grote, "Plato," ii.  585, on Philebus.  (5) Or, "made the happiest answer."   

Soc. Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for fever?

No (he replied), that is not my question.

Soc. Then for inflammation of the eyes?

Aristip. No, nor yet that.

Soc. Well then, for hunger?

Aristip. No, nor yet for hunger.

Well, but (answered Socrates) if you ask me whether I know of any good thing which is good for nothing, I neither know of it nor want to know.

And when Aristippus, returning to the charge, asked him "if he knew of any thing beautiful."

He answered: Yes, many things.

Aristip. Are they all like each other?

Soc. On the contrary, they are often as unlike as possible.

How then (he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?

Soc. Bless me! for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who is a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a beautiful boxer, (6) or for a shield, which is a beautiful weapon for the purpose of defence, to be absolutely unlike a javelin, which is a beautiful weapon of swift and sure discharge.

 (6) See Grote, "H.  G."  x.  164, in reference to Epaminondas and his     gymnastic training; below, III.  x.  6.   

Aristip. Your answers are no better now than (7) when I asked you whether you knew any good thing. They are both of a pattern.

 (7) Or, "You answer precisely as you did when..."   

Soc. And so they should be. Do you imagine that one thing is good and another beautiful? Do not you know that relatively to the same standard all things are at once beautiful and good? (8) In the first place, virtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a beautiful thing relatively to another standard; and in the next place, human beings, on the same principle (9) and relatively to the same standard, are called "beautiful and good"; and so the bodily frames of men relatively to the same standards are seen to be "beautiful and good," and in general all things capable of being used by man are regarded as at once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard—the standing being in each case what the thing happens to be useful for. (10)

 (8) Or, "good and beautiful are convertible terms: whatever is good is     beautiful, or whatever is beautiful is good."  (9) Or, "in the same breath."  Cf.  Plat.  "Hipp.  maj."  295 D; "Gorg."  474 D.  (10) Or, "and this standard is the serviceableness of the thing in     question."   

Aristip. Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung (11) is a beautiful thing?

 (11) Cf.  Plat.  "Hipp.  maj."  288 D, 290 D; and Grote's note, loc.  cit.  p.  381: "in regard to the question wherein consists {to kalon}?"   

Soc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their respective uses—the former is well and the latter ill adapted.

Aristip. Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and ugly?

Soc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and bad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for wrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when ill adapted for the same.

Similarly when he spoke about houses, (12) and argued that "the same house must be at once beautiful and useful"—I could not help feeling that he was giving a good lesson on the problem: "how a house ought to be built." He investigated the matter thus:

 (12) See K.  Joel, op.  cit.  p.  488; "Classical Review," vii.  262.   

Soc. "Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house (13) will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as possible?" and that point being admitted, (14) the next question would be:

 (13) Or, "the ideal house"; lit.  "a house as it should be."  (14) See below, IV.  vi.  15.   

"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter, is it not?" and this proposition also having obtained assent, "Now, supposing a house to have a southern aspect, sunshine during winter will steal in under the verandah, (15) but in summer, when the sun traverses a path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade, will it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern side of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter sun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding ingress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at all seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his goods with the greatest security."

 (15) Or, "porticoes" or "collonades."   

Paintings (16) and ornamental mouldings are apt (he said) to deprive one of more joy (17) than they confer.

 (16) See "Econ."  ix.  2; Plat.  "Hipp.  maj."  298 A; "Rep."  529; Becker,     "Charicles," 268 (Engl.  trans.)  (17) {euphrosunas}, archaic or "poetical" = "joyance."  See "Hiero,"     vi.  1.   

The fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site visible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: (18) since it was a glad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up his orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied. (19)

 (18) e.g.  the summit of Lycabettos, or the height on which stands the     temple of Phygaleia.  Cf.  Eur.  "Phoen."  1372, {Pallados     khrusaspidos blepsas pros oikon euxato} of Eteocles.  (19) See Vitruvius, i.  7, iv.  5, ap.  Schneid.  ad loc.  ; W.  L.  Newman,     op.  cit.  i.  338.   

IX

Being again asked by some one: could courage be taught, (1) or did it come by nature? he answered: I imagine that just as one body is by nature stronger than another body to encounter toils, so one soul by nature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers. Certainly I do note that people brought up under the same condition of laws and customs differ greatly in respect of daring. Still my belief is that by learning and practice the natural aptitude may always be strengthened towards courage. It is clear, for instance, that Scythians or Thracians would not venture to take shield and spear and contend with Lacedaemonians; and it is equally evident that Lacedaemonians would demur to entering the lists of battle against Thracians if limited to their light shields and javelins, or against Scythians without some weapon more familiar than their bows and arrows. (2) And as far as I can see, this principle holds generally: the natural differences of one man from another may be compensated by artificial progress, the result of care and attention. All which proves clearly that whether nature has endowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities, the duty of all alike is to learn and practise those things in which we would fain achieve distinction.

 (1) Or, "When some one retorted upon him with the question: 'Can     courage be taught?'  " and for this problem see IV.  vi.  10, 11;     "Symp."  ii.  12; Plat.  "Lach."  ; "Protag."  349; "Phaedr." 269 D; K.  Joel, op.  cit.  p.  325 foll.  ; Grote, "Plato," i.  468 foll.  , ii.  60;     Jowett, "Plato," i.  77, 119; Newman, op.  cit.  i.  343.  (2) Or, "against Thracians with light shields and javelins, or against     Scythians with bows and arrows"; and for the national arms of     these peoples respectively see Arist.  "Lysistr."  563; "Anab."  III.  iv.  15; VI.  VII.  passim.   

Between wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no distinction. (3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them? Had he, on the other hand, knowledge of the "base and foul" so as to beware of them? If so, Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate). (4)

 (3) But cf.  IV.  vi.  7; K.  Joel, op.  cit.  p.  363.  (4) Reading {alla to...  kai to}, or more lit.  "he discovered the     wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise     things 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have his     being in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things     base."  Or if {alla ton...  kai ton...}  transl.  "The man who     not only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc.,     in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, in     the judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul."  Cf.  Plat.  "Charm."   

And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and self-controlled?" —"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them to be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that those who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor self-controlled.

 (5) For the phrase "not a whit the more" see below, III.  xii.  1;     "Econ."  xii.  18.  Al.  "I should by no means choose to consider them     wise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate."  (6) "Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking."   

He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue, are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot, but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.

On the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom; not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, (7) but he put it thus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that he knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself, yet something very like it. The mass of men no doubt hold a different language: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of mankind are ignorant, they do not pronounce him "mad"; (8) but a like aberration of mind, if only it be about matters within the scope of ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who imagined himself too tall to pass under a gateway of the Long Wall without stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt any other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in the popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small matters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of passion in popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is entitled madness.

 (7) See K.  Joel, op.  cit.  p.  346; Grote, "Plato," i.  400.  (8) Or, "they resent the term 'mad' being applied to people who are     all abroad," etc. See Comte, "Pos.  Pol."  i.  575; ii.  373 (Engl.  trans.)   

In answer to the question: what is envy? he discovered it to be a certain kind of pain; not certainly the sorrow felt at the misfortunes of a friend or the good fortune of an enemy—that is not envy; but, as he said, "envy is felt by those alone who are annoyed at the successes of their friends." And when some one or other expressed astonishment that any one friendlily disposed to another should be pained at his well-doing, he reminded him of a common tendency in people: when any one is faring ill their sympathies are touched, they rush to the aid of the unfortunate; but when fortune smiles on others, they are somehow pained. "I do not say," he added, "this could happen to a thoughtful person; but it is no uncommon condition of a silly mind." (9)

 (9) Or, "a man in his senses...  a simpleton"; for the sentiment L.  Dind.  cf.  Isocr.  "ad Demonic."  7 D.   

In answer to the question: what is leisure? I discover (he said) that most men do something: (10) for instance, the dice player, (11) the gambler, the buffoon, do something, but these have leisure; they can, if they like, turn and do something better; but nobody has leisure to turn from the better to the worse, and if he does so turn, when he has no leisure, he does but ill in that.

 (10) See above, I.  ii.  57; and in ref.  to these definitions, K.  Joel,     op.  cit.  p.  347 foll.  (11) For "dice-playing" see Becker, "Charicl."  354 (Engl.  trans.)  ; for     "buffoonery," ib.  98; "Symp."   

(To pass to another definition.) They are not kings or rulers (he said) who hold the sceptre merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street, (12) or are appointed by lot, or have stepped into office by violence or by fraud; but those who have the special knowledge (13) how to rule. Thus having won the admission that it is the function of a ruler to enjoin what ought to be done, and of those who are ruled to obey, he proceeded to point out by instances that in a ship the ruler or captain is the man of special knowledge, to whom, as an expert, the shipowner himself and all the others on board obey. So likewise, in the matter of husbandry, the proprietor of an estate; in that of sickness, the patient; in that of physical training of the body, the youthful athlete going through a course; and, in general, every one directly concerned in any matter needing attention and care will either attend to this matter personally, if he thinks he has the special knowledge; or, if he mistrusts his own science, will be eager to obey any expert on the spot, or will even send and fetch one from a distance. The guidance of this expert he will follow, and do what he has to do at his dictation.

 (12) Tom, Dick, and Harry (as we say).  (13) The {episteme}.  See above, III.  v.  21; Newman, op.  cit.  i.  256.   

And thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women are the rulers of men—and why? because they have the knowledge of the art, and men have not.

And if any one raised the objection that a tyrant has it in his power not to obey good and correct advice, he would retort: "Pray, how has he the option not to obey, considering the penalty hanging over him who disobeys the words of wisdom? for whatever the matter be in which he disobeys the word of good advice, he will fall into error, I presume, and falling into error, be punished." And to the suggestion that the tyrant could, if he liked, cut off the head of the man of wisdom, his answer was: "Do you think that he who destroys his best ally will go scot free, or suffer a mere slight and passing loss? Is he more likely to secure his salvation that way, think you, or to compass his own swift destruction?" (14)

 (14) Or, "Is that to choose the path of safety, think you?  Is it not     rather to sign his own death-warrent?"  L.  Dind.  cf.  Hesiod, "Works     and Days," 293.  See Newman, op.  cit.  i.  393-397.   

When some one asked him: "What he regarded as the best pursuit or business (15) for a man?" he answered: "Successful conduct"; (16) and to a second question: "Did he then regard good fortune as an end to be pursued?" —"On the contrary," he answered, "for myself, I consider fortune and conduct to be diametrically opposed. For instance, to succeed in some desirable course of action without seeking to do so, I hold to be good fortune; but to do a thing well by dint of learning and practice, that according to my creed is successful conduct, (17) and those who make this the serious business of their life seem to me to do well."

 (15) Or, "the noblest study."  (16) {eupraxia, eu prattein}—to do well, in the sense both of well or     right doing, and of welfare, and is accordingly opposed to     {eutukhia}, mere good luck or success.  Cf.  Plat.  "Euthyd."  281 B.  (17) Lit.  "well-doing"; and for the Socratic view see Newman, op.  cit.  i.  305, 401.   

They are at once the best and the dearest in the sight of God (18) (he went on to say) who for instance in husbandry do well the things of farming, or in the art of healing all that belongs to healing, or in statecraft the affairs of state; whereas a man who does nothing well—nor well in anything—is (he added) neither good for anything nor dear to God.

 (18) Or, "most divinely favoured."  Cf.  Plat.  "Euthyphro," 7 A.   

X

But indeed, (1) if chance brought him into conversation with any one possessed of an art, and using it for daily purposes of business, he never failed to be useful to this kind of person. For instance, stepping one time into the studio of Parrhasius (2) the painter, and getting into conversation with him—

 (1) {alla men kai}...  "But indeed the sphere of his helpfulness was     not circumscribed; if," etc.   (2) For Parrhasius of Ephesus, the son of Evenor and rival of Zeuxis,     see Woltmann and Woermann, "Hist.  of Painting," p.  47 foll.  ;     Cobet, "Pros.  Xen."  p.  50 (cf.  in particular Quint.  XII.  x.  627).  At the date of conversation (real or ideal) he may be supposed to     have been a young man.   

I suppose, Parrhasius (said he), painting may be defined as "a representation of visible objects," may it not? (3) That is to say, by means of colours and palette you painters represent and reproduce as closely as possible the ups and downs, lights and shadows, hard and soft, rough and smooth surfaces, the freshness of youth and the wrinkles of age, do you not?

 (3) Reading with Schneider, L.  Dind.  , etc., after Stobaeus, {e     graphike estin eikasia}, or if the vulg.  {graphike estin e     eikasia}, trans.  "Painting is the term applied to a particular     representation," etc. 

You are right (he answered), that is so.

Soc. Further, in portraying ideal types of beauty, seeing it is not easy to light upon any one human being who is absolutely devoid of blemish, you cull from many models the most beautiful traits of each, and so make your figures appear completely beautiful? (4)

 (4) Cf.  Cic.  "de Invent."  ii.  1 ad in.  of Zeuxis; Max.  Tur.  "Dissert."  23, 3, ap.  Schneider ad loc.   

Parrh. Yes, that is how we do. (5)

 (5) Or, "that is the secret of our creations," or "our art of     composition."   

Well, but stop (Socrates continued); do you also pretend to represent in similar perfection the characteristic moods of the soul, its captivating charm and sweetness, with its deep wells of love, its intensity of yearning, its burning point of passion? or is all this quite incapable of being depicted?

Nay (he answered), how should a mood be other than inimitable, Socrates, when it possesses neither linear proportion (6) nor colour, nor any of those qualities which you named just now; when, in a word, it is not even visible?

 (6) Lit.  "symmetry."  Cf.  Plin.  xxxv.  10, "primus symmetriam picturae     dedit," etc. 

Soc. Well, but the kindly look of love, the angry glance of hate at any one, do find expression in the human subject, do they not? (7)

 (7) Or, "the glance of love, the scowl of hate, which one directs     towards another, are recognised expressions of human feeling."  Cf.  the description of Parrhasius's own portrait of Demos, ap.  Plin.  loc.  cit.   

Parrh. No doubt they do.

Soc. Then this look, this glance, at any rate may be imitated in the eyes, may it not?

Undoubtedly (he answered).

Soc. And do anxiety and relief of mind occasioned by the good or evil fortune of those we love both wear the same expression?

By no means (he answered); at the thought of good we are radiant, at that of evil a cloud hangs on the brow.

Soc. Then here again are looks with it is possible to represent?

Parrh. Decidedly.

Soc. Furthermore, as through some chink or crevice, there pierces through the countenance of a man, through the very posture of his body as he stands or moves, a glimpse of his nobility and freedom, or again of something in him low and grovelling—the calm of self-restraint, and wisdom, or the swagger of insolence and vulgarity?

You are right (he answered).

Soc. Then these too may be imitated?

No doubt (he said).

Soc. And which is the pleasanter type of face to look at, do you think—one on which is imprinted the characteristics of a beautiful, good, and lovable disposition, or one which bears the impress of what is ugly, and bad, and hateful? (8)

 (8) For this theory cp.  Ruskin, "Mod.  P."  ii.  94 foll.  and indeed     passim.   

Parrh. Doubtless, Socrates, there is a vast distinction between the two.

At another time he entered the workshop of the sculptor Cleiton, (9) and in course of conversation with him said:

 (9) An unknown artist.  Coraes conj.  {Kleona}.  Cf.  Plin.  xxxiv.  19;     Paus.  v.  17, vi.  3.  He excelled in portrait statues.  See Jowett,     "Plato," iv.  ; "Laws," p.  123.   

You have a gallery of handsome people here, (10) Cleiton, runners, and wrestlers, and boxers, and pancratiasts—that I see and know; but how do you give the magic touch of life to your creations, which most of all allures the soul of the beholder through his sense of vision?

 (10) Reading after L.  Dind.  {kaloi ous}, or if vulg.  {alloious},     translate "You have a variety of types, Cleiton, not all of one     mould, but runners," etc.; al.  "I see quite well how you give the     diversity of form to your runners," etc. 

As Cleiton stood perplexed, and did not answer at once, Socrates added: Is it by closely imitating the forms of living beings that you succeed in giving that touch of life to your statues?

No doubt (he answered).

Soc. It is, is it not, by faithfully copying the various muscular contractions of the body in obedience to the play of gesture and poise, the wrinklings of flesh and the sprawl of limbs, the tensions and the relaxations, that you succeed in making your statues like real beings—make them "breathe" as people say?

Cleit. Without a doubt.

Soc. And does not the faithful imitation of the various affections of the body when engaged in any action impart a particular pleasure to the beholder?

Cleit. I should say so.

Soc. Then the threatenings in the eyes of warriors engaged in battle should be carefully copied, or again you should imitate the aspect of a conqueror radiant with success?

Cleit. Above all things.

Soc. It would seem then that the sculptor is called upon to incorporate in his ideal form the workings and energies also of the soul?

Paying a visit to Pistias, (11) the corselet maker, when that artist showed him some exquisite samples of his work, Socrates exclaimed:

 (11) Cf.  Athen.  iv.  20, where the same artist is referred to     apparently as {Piston}, and for the type of person see the     "Portrait of a Tailor" by Moroni in the National Gallery—see     "Handbook," Edw.  T.  Cook, p.  152.   

By Hera! a pretty invention this, Pistias, by which you contrive that the corselet should cover the parts of the person which need protection, and at the same time leave free play to the arms and hands.... but tell me, Pistias (he added), why do you ask a higher price for these corselets of yours if they are not stouter or made of costlier material than the others?

Because, Socrates (he answered), mine are of much finer proportion.

Soc. Proportion! Then how do you make this quality apparent to the customer so as to justify the higher price—by measure or weight? For I presume you cannot make them all exactly equal and of one pattern—if you make them fit, as of course you do?

Fit indeed! that I most distinctly do (he answered), take my word for it: no use in a corselet without that.

But then are not the wearer's bodies themselves (asked Socrates) some well proportioned and others ill?

Decidedly so (he answered).

Soc. Then how do you manage to make the corselet well proportioned if it is to fit an ill-proportioned body? (12)

 (12) Or, "how do you make a well-proportioned corselet fit an ill-       proportioned body?  how well proportioned?"   

Pist. To the same degree exactly as I make it fit. What fits is well proportioned.

Soc. It seems you use the term "well-proportioned" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to the wearer, just as you might describe a shield as well proportioned to the individual it suits; and so of a military cloak, and so of the rest of things, in your terminology? But maybe there is another considerable advantage in this "fitting"?

Pist. Pray instruct me, Socrates, if you have got an idea.

Soc. A corselet which fits is less galling by its weight than one which does not fit, for the latter must either drag from the shoulders with a dead weight or press upon some other part of the body, and so it becomes troublesome and uncomfortable; but that which fits, having its weight distributed partly along the collar-bone and shoulder-blade, partly over the shoulders and chest, and partly the back and belly, feels like another natural integument rather than an extra load to carry. (13)

 (13) Schneider ad loc.  cf Eur.  "Electr."  192, {prosthemata aglaias},     and for the weight cf.  Aristoph.  "Peace," 1224.   

Pist. You have named the very quality which gives my work its exceptional value, as I consider; still there are customers, I am bound to say, who look for something else in a corselet—they must have them ornamental or inlaid with gold.

For all that (replied Socrates), if they end by purchasing an ill-fitting article, they only become the proprietors of a curiously-wrought and gilded nuisance, as it seems to me. But (he added), as the body is never in one fixed position, but is at one time curved, at another raised erect how can an exactly-modelled corselet fit?

Pist. It cannot fit at all.

You mean (Socrates continued) that it is not the exactly-modelled corselet which fits, but that which does not gall the wearer in the using?

Pist. There, Socrates, you have hit the very point. I see you understand the matter most precisely. (14)

 (14) Or, "There, Socrates, you have hit the very phrase.  I could not     state the matter more explicitly myself."   

XI

There was once in the city a fair woman named Theodote. (1) She was not only fair, but ready to consort with any suitor who might win her favour. Now it chanced that some one of the company mentioned her, saying that her beauty beggared description. "So fair is she," he added, "that painters flock to draw her portrait, to whom, within the limits of decorum, she displays the marvels of her beauty." "Then there is nothing for it but to go and see her," answered Socrates, "since to comprehend by hearsay what is beyond description is clearly impossible." Then he who had introduced the matter replied: "Be quick then to follow me"; and on this wise they set off to seek Theodote. They found her "posing" to a certain painter; and they took their stand as spectators. Presently the painter had ceased his work; whereupon Socrates:

 (1) For Theodote see Athen.  v.  200 F, xiii.  574 F; Liban.  i.  582.  Some     say that it was Theodote who stood by Alcibiades to the last,     though there are apparently other better claimants to the honour.  Plut.  "Alc."  (Clough, ii.  p.  50).   

"Do you think, sirs, that we ought to thank Theodote for displaying her beauty to us, or she us for coming to gaze at her?... It would seem, would it not, that if the exhibition of her charms is the more profitable to her, the debt is on her side; but if the spectacle of her beauty confers the greater benefit on us, then we are her debtors."

Some one answered that "was an equitable statement of the case."

Well then (he continued), as far as she is concerned, the praise we bestow on her is an immediate gain; and presently, when we have spread her fame abroad, she will be further benefited; but for ourselves the immediate effect on us is a strong desire to touch what we have seen; by and by, too, we shall go away with a sting inside us, and when we are fairly gone we shall be consumed with longing. Consequently it seems that we should do her service and she accept our court.

Whereupon Theodote: Oh dear! if that is how the matter stands, it is I who am your debtor for the spectacle. (2)

 (2) In reference to the remark of Socrates above; or, "have to thank     you for coming to look at me."   

At this point, seeing that the lady herself was expensively attired, and that she had with her her mother also, whose dress and style of attendance (3) were out of the common, not to speak of the waiting-women—many and fair to look upon, who presented anything but a forlorn appearance; while in every respect the whole house itself was sumptuously furnished—Socrates put a question:

 (3) Or, "her mother there with her in a dress and general get-up     ({therapeia}) which was out of the common."  See Becker,     "Charicles," p.  247 (Eng.  tr.)   

Pray tell me, Theodote, have you an estate in the country?

Theod. Not I indeed.

Soc. Then perhaps you possess a house and large revenues along with it?

Theod. No, nor yet a house.

Soc. You are not an employer of labour on a large scale? (4)

 (4) Lit.  "You have not (in your employ) a body of handicraftsmen of     any sort?"   

Theod. No, nor yet an employer of labour.

Soc. From what source, then, do you get your means of subsistence? (5)

 (5) Or, Anglice, "derive your income."   

Theod. My friends are my life and fortune, when they care to be kind to me.

Soc. By heaven, Theodote, a very fine property indeed, and far better worth possessing than a multitude of sheep or goats or cattle. A flock of friends!... But (he added) do you leave it to fortune whether a friend lights like a fly on your hand at random, or do you use any artifice (6) yourself to attract him?

 (6) Or, "means and appliances," "machinery."   

Theod. And how might I hit upon any artifice to attract him?

Soc. Bless me! far more naturally than any spider. You know how they capture the creatures on which they live; (7) by weaving webs of gossamer, is it not? and woe betide the fly that tumbles into their toils! They eat him up.

 (7) Lit.  "the creatures on which they live."   

Theod. So then you would counsel me to weave myself some sort of net?

Soc. Why, surely you do not suppose you are going to ensnare that noblest of all game—a lover, to wit—in so artless a fashion? Do you not see (to speak of a much less noble sort of game) what a number of devices are needed to bag a hare? (8) The creatures range for their food at night; therefore the hunter must provide himself with night dogs. At peep of dawn they are off as fast as they can run. He must therefore have another pack of dogs to scent out and discover which way they betake them from their grazing ground to their forms; (9) and as they are so fleet of foot that they run and are out of sight in no time, he must once again be provided with other fleet-footed dogs to follow their tracks and overtake them; (10) and as some of them will give even these the slip, he must, last of all, set up nets on the paths at the points of escape, so that they may fall into the meshes and be caught.

 (8) See the author's own treatise on "Hunting," vi.  6 foll.  (9) Lit.  "from pasture to bed."  (10) Or, "close at their heels and run them down."  See "Hunting"; cf.  "Cyrop."  I.  vi.  40.   

Theod. And by what like contrivance would you have me catch my lovers?

Soc. Well now! what if in place of a dog you can get a man who will hunt up your wealthy lover of beauty and discover his lair, and having found him, will plot and plan to throw him into your meshes?

Theod. Nay, what sort of meshes have I?

Soc. One you have, and a close-folding net it is, (11) I trow; to wit, your own person; and inside it sits a soul that teaches you (12) with what looks to please and with what words to cheer; how, too, with smiles you are to welcome true devotion, but to exclude all wantons from your presence. (13) It tells you, you are to visit your beloved in sickness with solicitude, and when he has wrought some noble deed you are greatly to rejoice with him; and to one who passionately cares for you, you are to make surrender of yourself with heart and soul. The secret of true love I am sure you know: not to love softly merely, but devotedly. (14) And of this too I am sure: you can convince your lovers of your fondness for them not by lip phrases, but by acts of love.

 (11) Or, "right well woven."  (12) Lit.  "by which you understand."  (13) Or, "with what smiles to lie in wait for (cf.  'Cyrop.'  II.  iv.  20; Herod.  vi.  104) the devoted admirer, and how to banish from     your presence the voluptary."  (14) Or, "that it should be simply soft, but full of tender goodwill."   

Theod. No, upon my word, I have none of these devices.

Soc. And yet it makes all the difference whether you approach a human being in the natural and true way, since it is not by force certainly that you can either catch or keep a friend. Kindness and pleasure are the only means to capture this fearful wild-fowl man and keep him constant.

Theod. You are right.

Soc. In the first place you must make such demands only of your well-wisher as he can grant without repentance; and in the next place you must make requital, dispensing your favours with a like economy. Thus you will best make friends whose love shall last the longest and their generosity know no stint. (15) And for your favours you will best win your friends if you suit your largess to their penury; for, mark you, the sweetest viands presented to a man before he wants them are apt to prove insipid, or, to one already sated, even nauseous; but create hunger, and even coarser stuff seems honey-sweet.

 (15) Or, "This is the right road to friendship—permanent and open-     handed friendship."   

Theod. How then shall I create this hunger in the heart of my friends?

Soc. In the first place you must not offer or make suggestion of your dainties to jaded appetites until satiety has ceased and starvation cries for alms. Even then shall you make but a faint suggestion to their want, with modest converse—like one who would fain bestow a kindness... and lo! the vision fades and she is gone—until the very pinch of hunger; for the same gifts have then a value unknown before the moment of supreme desire.

Then Theodote: Oh why, Socrates, why are you not by my side (like the huntsman's assistant) to help me catch my friends and lovers?

Soc. That will I be in good sooth if only you can woo and win me.

Theod. How shall I woo and win you?

Soc. Seek and you will find means, if you truly need me.

Theod. Come then in hither and visit me often.

And Socrates, poking sly fun at his own lack of business occupation, answered: Nay, Theodote, leisure is not a commodity in which I largely deal. I have a hundred affairs of my own too, private or public, to occupy me; and then there are my lady-loves, my dear friends, who will not suffer me day or night to leave them, for ever studying to learn love-charms and incantations at my lips.

Theod. Why, are you really versed in those things, Socrates?

Soc. Of course, or else how is it, do you suppose, that Apollodorus (16) here and Antisthenes never leave me; or why have Cebes and Simmias come all the way from Thebes to stay with me? Be assured these things cannot happen without diverse love-charms and incantations and magic wheels.

 (16) For Apollodorus see "Apol."  28; Plat.  "Symp."  172 A; "Phaed."  59     A, 117 D.  For Antisthenes see above.  For Cebes and Simmias see     above, I.  ii.  48; Plat.  "Crit."  45 B; "Phaed."  passim.   

Theod. I wish you would lend me your magic-wheel, (17) then, and I will set it spinning first of all for you.

 (17) Cf.  Theocr.  ii.  17; Schneider ad loc.   

Soc. Ah! but I do not wish to be drawn to you. I wish you to come to me.

Theod. Then I will come. Only, will you be "at home" to me?

Soc. Yes, I will welcome you, unless some one still dearer holds me engaged, and I must needs be "not at home."

XII

Seeing one of those who were with him, a young man, but feeble of body, named Epigenes, (1) he addressed him.

 (1) Epigenes, possibly the son of Antiphon.  See Plat.  "Apol."  33 E;     "Phaed."  59 B.   

Soc. You have not the athletic appearance of a youth in training, (2) Epigenes.

 (2) {idiotikos}, lit.  of the person untrained in gymnastics.  See A.  R.  Cluer ad loc.  Cf.  Plat.  "Laws," 839 E; I.  ii.  4; III.  v.  15;     "Symp."  ii.  17.   

And he: That may well be, seeing I am an amateur and not in training.

Soc. As little of an amateur, I take it, as any one who ever entered the lists of Olympia, unless you are prepared to make light of that contest for life and death against the public foe which the Athenians will institute when the day comes. (3) And yet they are not a few who, owing to a bad habit of body, either perish outright in the perils of war, or are ignobly saved. Many are they who for the self-same cause are taken prisoners, and being taken must, if it so betide, endure the pains of slavery for the rest of their days; or, after falling into dolorous straits, (4) when they have paid to the uttermost farthing of all, or may be more than the worth of all, that they possess, must drag on a miserable existence in want of the barest necessaries until death release them. Many also are they who gain an evil repute through infirmity of body, being thought to play the coward. Can it be that you despise these penalties affixed to an evil habit? Do you think you could lightly endure them? Far lighter, I imagine, nay, pleasant even by comparison, are the toils which he will undergo who duly cultivates a healthy bodily condition. Or do you maintain that the evil habit is healthier, and in general more useful than the good? Do you pour contempt upon those blessings which flow from the healthy state? And yet the very opposite of that which befalls the ill attends the sound condition. Does not the very soundness imply at once health and strength? (5) Many a man with no other talisman than this has passed safely through the ordeal of war; stepping, not without dignity, (6) through all its horrors unscathed. Many with no other support than this have come to the rescue of friends, or stood forth as benefactors of their fatherland; whereby they were thought worthy of gratitude, and obtained a great renown and received as a recompense the highest honours of the State; to whom is also reserved a happier and brighter passage through what is left to them of life, and at their death they leave to their children the legacy of a fairer starting-point in the race of life.

 (3) Or, "should chance betide."  Is the author thinking of a life-and-     death struggle with Thebes?  (4) e.g.  the prisoners in the Latomiae.  Thuc.  vii.  87.  (5) It is almost a proverb—"Sound of body and limb is hale and     strong."  "Qui valet praevalebit."  (6) e.g.  Socrates himself, according to Alcibiades, ap.  Plat.  "Symp."  221 B; and for the word {euskhemonos} see Arist.  "Wasps," 1210,     "like a gentleman"; L.  and S.  ; "Cyr."  I.  iii.  8; Aristot.  "Eth.  N."  i.  10, 13, "gracefully."   

Because our city does not practise military training in public, (7) that is no reason for neglecting it in private, but rather a reason for making it a foremost care. For be you assured that there is no contest of any sort, nor any transaction, in which you will be the worse off for being well prepared in body; and in fact there is nothing which men do for which the body is not a help. In every demand, therefore, which can be laid upon the body it is much better that it should be in the best condition; since, even where you might imagine the claims upon the body to be slightest—in the act of reasoning—who does not know the terrible stumbles which are made through being out of health? It suffices to say that forgetfulness, and despondency, and moroseness, and madness take occasion often of ill-health to visit the intellectual faculties so severely as to expel all knowledge (8) from the brain. But he who is in good bodily plight has large security. He runs no risk of incurring any such catastrophe through ill-health at any rate; he has the expectation rather that a good habit must procure consequences the opposite to those of an evil habit; (9) and surely to this end there is nothing a man in his senses would not undergo.... It is a base thing for a man to wax old in careless self-neglect before he has lifted up his eyes and seen what manner of man he was made to be, in the full perfection of bodily strength and beauty. But these glories are withheld from him who is guilty of self-neglect, for they are not wont to blaze forth unbidden. (10)

 (7) Cf.  "Pol.  Ath."  i.  13; and above, III.  v.  15.  (8) Or, "whole branches of knowledge" ({tas epistemas}).  (9) Or, "he may well hope to be insured by his good habit against the     evils attendant on its opposite."  (10) Or, "to present themselves spontaneously."   

XII

Once when some one was in a fury of indignation because he had bidden a passer-by good-day and the salutation was not returned, Socrates said: "It is enough to make one laugh! If you met a man in a wretched condition of body, you would not fall into a rage; but because you stumble upon a poor soul somewhat boorishly disposed, you feel annoyed."

To the remark of another who complained that he did not take his food with pleasure, he said: "Acumenus (1) has a good prescription for that." And when the other asked: "And what may that be?" "To stop eating," he said. "On the score of pleasure, economy, and health, total abstinence has much in its favour." (2)

 (1) A well-known physician.  See Plat.  "Phaedr." 227 A, 269 A; "Symp."  176 B.  A similar story is told of Dr. Abernethy, I think.  (2) Lit.  "he would live a happier, thriftier, and healthier life, if     he stopped eating."   

And when some one else lamented that "the drinking-water in his house was hot," he replied: "Then when you want a warm bath you will not have to wait."

The Other. But for bathing purposes it is cold.

Soc. Do you find that your domestics seem to mind drinking it or washing in it?

The Other. Quite the reverse; it is a constant marvel to me how contentedly they use it for either purpose.

Soc. Which is hotter to the taste—the water in your house or the hot spring in the temple of Asclepius? (3)

 (3) In the Hieron at Epidauros probably.  See Baedeker, "Greece," p.  240 foll.   

The Other. The water in the temple of Asclepius.

Soc. And which is colder for bathing—yours or the cold spring in the cave of Amphiaraus? (4)

 (4) Possibly at Oropos.  Cf.  Paus.  i.  34.  3.   

The Other. The water in the cave of Amphiaraus.

Soc. Then please to observe: if you do not take care, they will set you down as harder to please than a domestic servant or an invalid. (5)

 (5) i.e.  "the least and the most fastidious of men."   

A man had administered a severe whipping to the slave in attendance on him, and when Socrates asked: "Why he was so wroth with his own serving-man?" excused himself on the ground that "the fellow was a lazy, gourmandising, good-for-nothing dolt—fonder of money than of work." To which Socrates: "Did it ever strike you to consider which of the two in that case the more deserves a whipping—the master or the man?"

When some one was apprehending the journey to Olympia, "Why are you afraid of the long distance?" he asked. "Here at home you spend nearly all your day in taking walks. (6) Well, on your road to Olympia you will take a walk and breakfast, and then you will take another walk and dine, and go to bed. Do you not see, if you take and tack together five or six days' length of walks, and stretch them out in one long line, it will soon reach from Athens to Olympia? I would recommend you, however, to set off a day too soon rather than a day too late. To be forced to lengthen the day's journey beyond a reasonable amount may well be a nuisance; but to take one day's journey beyond what is necessary is pure relaxation. Make haste to start, I say, and not while on the road." (7)

 (6) {peripateis}, "promenading up and down."  (7) "Festina lente"—that is your motto.   

When some one else remarked "he was utterly prostrated after a long journey," Socrates asked him: "Had he had any baggage to carry?"

"Not I," replied the complainer; "only my cloak."

Soc. Were you travelling alone, or was your man-servant with you?

He. Yes, I had my man.

Soc. Empty-handed, or had he something to carry?

He. Of course; carrying my rugs and other baggage.

Soc. And how did he come off on the journey?

He. Better than I did myself, I take it.

Soc. Well, but now suppose you had had to carry his baggage, what would your condition have been like?

He. Sorry enough, I can tell you; or rather, I could not have carried it at all.

Soc. What a confession! Fancy being capable of so much less toil than a poor slave boy! Does that sound like the perfection of athletic training?

XIV

On the occasion of a common dinner-party (1) where some of the company would present themselves with a small, and others with a large supply of viands, Socrates would bid the servants (2) throw the small supplies into the general stock, or else to help each of the party to a share all round. Thus the grand victuallers were ashamed in the one case not to share in the common stock, and in the other not to throw in their supplies also. (3) Accordingly in went the grand supplies into the common stock. And now, being no better off than the small contributors, they soon ceased to cater for expensive delicacies.

 (1) For the type of entertainment see Becker, "Charicles," p.  315     (Eng.  tr.)  (2) "The boy."  (3) Or, "were ashamed not to follow suit by sharing in the common     stock and contributing their own portion."   

At a supper-party one member of the company, as Socrates chanced to note, had put aside the plain fare and was devoting himself to certain dainties. (4) A discussion was going on about names and definitions, and the proper applications of terms to things. (5) Whereupon Socrates, appealing to the company: "Can we explain why we call a man a 'dainty fellow'? What is the particular action to which the term applies? (6)—since every one adds some dainty to his food when he can get it. (7) But we have not quite hit the definition yet, I think. Are we to be called dainty eaters because we like our bread buttered?" (8)

 (4) For the distinction between {sitos} and {opson} see Plat.  "Rep."  372 C.  (5) Or, "The conversation had fallen upon names: what is the precise     thing denoted under such and such a term?  Define the meaning of so     and so."  (6) {opsophagos} = {opson} (or relish) eater, and so a "gourmand" or     "epicure"; but how to define a gourmand?  (7) Lit.  "takes some {opson} (relish) to his {sitos} (food)."  (8) Lit.  "simply for that" (sc.  the taking of some sort of {opson}.  For {epi touto} cf.  Plat.  "Soph."  218 C; "Parmen."  147 D.)   

No! hardly! (some member of the company replied).

Soc. Well, but now suppose a man confine himself to eating venison or other dainty without any plain food at all, not as a matter of training, (9) but for the pleasure of it: has such a man earned the title? "The rest of the world would have a poor chance against him," (10) some one answered. "Or," interposed another, "what if the dainty dishes he devours are out of all proportion to the rest of his meal—what of him?" (11)

 (9) Lit.  "{opson} (relish) by itself, not for the sake of training,"     etc. The English reader wil bear in mind that a raw beefsteak or     other meat prescribed by the gymnastic trainer in preference to     farinaceous food ({sitos}) would be {opson}.  (10) Or, more lit.  "Hardly any one could deserve the appellation     better."  (11) Lit.  "and what of the man who eats much {opson} on the top of a     little ({sitos})?"  {epesthion} = follows up one course by another,     like the man in a fragment of Euripides, "Incert."  98: {kreasi     boeiois khlora suk' epesthien}, who "followed up his beefsteak     with a garnish of green figs."   

Soc. He has established a very fair title at any rate to the appellation, and when the rest of the world pray to heaven for a fine harvest: "May our corn and oil increase!" he may reasonably ejaculate, "May my fleshpots multiply!"

At this last sally the young man, feeling that the conversation set somewhat in his direction, did not desist indeed from his savoury viands, but helped himself generously to a piece of bread. Socrates was all-observant, and added: Keep an eye on our friend yonder, you others next him, and see fair play between the sop and the sauce. (12)

 (12) Lit.  "see whether he will make a relish of the staple or a staple     of the relish" ("butter his bread or bread his butter").   

Another time, seeing one of the company using but one sop of bread (13) to test several savoury dishes, he remarked: Could there be a more extravagant style of cookery, or more murderous to the dainty dishes themselves, than this wholesale method of taking so many dishes together? —why, bless me, twenty different sorts of seasoning at one swoop! (14) First of all he mixes up actually more ingredients than the cook himself prescribes, which is extravagant; and secondly, he has the audacity to commingle what the chef holds incongruous, whereby if the cooks are right in their method he is wrong in his, and consequently the destroyer of their art. Now is it not ridiculous first to procure the greatest virtuosi to cook for us, and then without any claim to their skill to take and alter their procedure? But there is a worse thing in store for the bold man who habituates himself to eat a dozen dishes at once: when there are but few dishes served, out of pure habit he will feel himself half starved, whilst his neighbour, accustomed to send his sop down by help of a single relish, will feast merrily, be the dishes never so few.

 (13) {psomos}, a sop or morsel of bread (cf.  {psomion}, N.  T.  , in mod.  Greek = "bread").  (14) Huckleberry Finn (p.  2 of that young person's "Adventures")     propounds the rationale of the system: "In a barrel of odds and     ends it is different; things get mixed up, and the juice kind of     swaps around, and the things go better."   

He had a saying that {euokheisthai}, to "make good cheer," (15) was in Attic parlance a synonym for "eating," and the affix {eu} (the attributive "good") connoted the eating of such things as would not trouble soul or body, and were not far to seek or hard to find. So that to "make good cheer" in his vocabulary applied to a modest and well-ordered style of living. (16)

 (15) {euokheisthai}, cf.  "Cyrop."  IV.  v.  7; "Pol.  Ath."  ii.  9; Kuhner     cf.  Eustah.  "ad Il."  ii.  p.  212, 37, {'Akhaioi ten trophen okhen     legousin oxutonos}.  Athen.  viii.  363 B.  See "Hipparch," viii.  4,     of horses.  Cf.  Arist.  "H.  A."  viii.  6.  (16) See "Symp."  vi.  7; and for similar far-fetched etymologies, Plat.  "Crat."  passim.   

BOOK IV

I

Such was Socrates; so helpful under all circumstances and in every way that no observer, gifted with ordinary sensibility, could fail to appreciate the fact, that to be with Socrates, and to spend long time in his society (no matter where or what the circumstances), was indeed a priceless gain. Even the recollection of him, when he was no longer present, was felt as no small benefit by those who had grown accustomed to be with him, and who accepted him. Nor indeed was he less helpful to his acquaintance in his lighter than in his graver moods.

Let us take as an example that saying of his, so often on his lips: "I am in love with so and so"; and all the while it was obvious the going-forth of his soul was not towards excellence of body in the bloom of beauty, but rather towards faculties of the soul unfolding in virtue. (1) And these "good natures" he detected by certain tokens: a readiness to learn that to which the attention was directed; a power of retaining in the memory the lessons learnt; and a passionate predilection for those studies in particular which serve to good administration of a house or of a state, (2) and in general to the proper handling of man and human affairs. Such beings, he maintained, needed only to be educated (3) to become not only happy themselves and happy administrators of their private households, but to be capable of rendering other human beings as states or individuals happy also.

 (1) Or, "not excellence of body in respect of beauty, but of the soul     as regards virtue; and this good natural disposition might be     detected by the readiness of its possessor to learn," etc. Cf.  Plat.  "Rep."  535 B.  (2) Cf.  above, I.  i.  7.  (3) Or, "A person of this type would, if educated, not only prove a     fortune-favoured individual himself and," etc. Al.  Kuhner, "Eos,     qui ita instituti sunt, ut tales sint."   

He had indeed a different way of dealing with different kinds of people. (4) Those who thought they had good natural ability and despised learning he instructed that the most highly-gifted nature stands most in need of training and education; (5) and he would point out how in the case of horses it is just the spirited and fiery thoroughbred which, if properly broken in as a colt, will develop into a serviceable and superb animal, but if left unbroken will turn out utterly intractable and good for nothing. Or take the case of dogs: a puppy exhibiting that zest for toil and eagerness to attack wild creatures which are the marks of high breeding, (6) will, if well brought up, prove excellent for the chase or for any other useful purpose; but neglect his education and he will turn out a stupid, crazy brute, incapable of obeying the simplest command. It is just the same with human beings; here also the youth of best natural endowments—that is to say, possessing the most robust qualities of spirit and a fixed determination to carry out whatever he has laid his hand to—will, if trained and taught what it is right to do, prove a superlatively good and useful man. He achieves, in fact, what is best upon the grandest scale. But leave him in boorish ignorance untrained, and he will prove not only very bad but very mischievous, (7) and for this reason, that lacking the knowledge to discern what is right to do, he will frequently lay his hand to villainous practices; whilst the very magnificence and vehemence of his character render it impossible either to rein him in or to turn him aside from his evil courses. Hence in his case also his achievements are on the grandest scale but of the worst. (8)

 (4) Or, "His method of attack was not indeed uniformly the same.  It     varied with the individual."  (5) Or, "If any one was disposed to look down upon learning and study     in reliance upon his own natural ability, he tried to lesson him     that it is just the highly-gifted nature which stands," etc. See     Newman, op.  cit.  i.  397.  (6) Cf.  Aristot.  "H.  A."  ix.  1; and "Hunting," iii.  11.  (7) Or, "and the same man may easily become a master villain of the     most dangerous sort."  (8) Kuhner ad loc.  after Fr.  Hermann cf.  Plato.  "Crito," 44 E; "Hipp.  min."  375 E; "Rep."  vi.  491 E; "Gorg."  526 A; "Polit."  303 A.   

Or to take the type of person so eaten up with the pride of riches that he conceives himself dispensed from any further need of education—since it is "money makes the man," and his wealth will amply suffice him to carry out his desires and to win honours from admiring humanity. (9) Socrates would bring such people to their senses by pointing out the folly of supposing that without instruction it was possible to draw the line of demarcation (10) between what is gainful and what is hurtful in conduct; and the further folly of supposing that, apart from such discrimination, a man could help himself by means of wealth alone to whatever he liked or find the path of expediency plain before him; and was it not the veriest simplicity to suppose that, without the power of labouring profitably, a man can either be doing well or be in any sort of way sufficiently equipped for the battle of life? and again, the veriest simplicity to suppose that by mere wealth without true knowledge it was possible either to purchase a reputation for some excellence, or without such reputation to gain distinction and celebrity?

 (9) Or, "and to be honoured by mankind."  (10) Or, "that without learning the distinction it was possible to     distinguish between," etc. 

II

Or to come to a third kind—the class of people who are persuaded that they have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom: his manner of dealing with these I will now describe.

Euthydemus (1) "the beautiful" had (Socrates was given to understand) collected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and philosophers, (2) by help of which he already believed himself to be more than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might presently expect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and action. (3) At first, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his youth had not as yet set foot in the agora, (4) but if he had anything to transact, his habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard by. Accordingly to this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself with some of those who were with him. And first the question was started by some one: "Was it through consorting with the wise, (5) or by his own unaided talent, that Themistocles came so to surpass his fellow-citizens that when the services of a capable man were needed the eyes of the whole community instinctively turned to him?" Socrates, with a view to stirring (6) Euthydemus, answered: There was certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the belief that superiority in arts of comparatively little worth could only be attained by aid of qualified teachers, but that the leadership of the state, the most important concern of all, was destined to drop into the lap of anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall. (7)

 (1) Euthydemus, the son of Diocles perhaps.  See Plat.  "Symp."  222 B,     and Jowet ad loc.  ; Cobet, "Prosop.  Xen."  s.  n.  ; K.  Joel, op.  cit.  p.  372 foll.  For {ton kalon} cf.  "Phaedr." 278 E, "Isocrates the     fair."  For the whole chapter cf.  Plat.  "Alc."  i.  ; "Lys."  210 E.  See above, "Mem."  I.  ii.  29; Grote, "Plato," i.  ch.  x.  passim.  (2) Lit.  "sophists."  See Grote, "H.  G."  viii.  p.  480, note.  For     private libraries see Becker, "Char."  p.  272 foll.  (Eng.  tr.)  (3) See "Hipparch," i.  24; "Cyrop."  V.  v.  46.  (4) See above, III.  vi.  1; Schneid.  cf.  Isocr.  "Areop."  149 C.  (5) Cf.  Soph.  fr.  12, {sophoi turannoi ton sophon xunousia}.  (6) L.  and S.  cf.  Plat.  "Lys."  223 A; "Rep."  329 B: "Wishing to draw     him out."  (7) Cf.  Plat.  "Alc."  i.  118 C: "And Pericles is said not to have got     his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with     several of the philosophers" (Jowett).   

On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was plain to see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly concourse, (8) as if he would choose anything rather than appear to admire Socrates on the score of wisdom, the latter made the following remarks.

 (8) {sunedrias}, "the council."   

Soc. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when our friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state propounds some question for solution, he will not abstain from offering the benefit of his advice? One can imagine the pretty exordium to his parliamentary speeches which, in his anxiety not to be thought to have learnt anything from anybody, he has ready for the occasion. (9) Clearly at the outset he will deliver himself thus: "Men of Athens, I have never at any time learnt anything from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard of any one as being an able statesman, well versed in speech and capable of action, have I sought to come across him individually. I have not so much as been at pains to provide myself with a teacher from amongst those who have knowledge; (10) on the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I will not say learning from others, but the very faintest suspicion of so doing. However, anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I shall be glad to place at your disposal." ... How appropriate (11) would such a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of state physician, (12) would it not? How advantageously he might begin an address on this wise: "Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of healing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with any teacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been ever on my guard not only against learning anything from the profession, but against the very notion of having studied medicine at all. If, however, you will be so good as to confer on me this post, I promise I will do my best to acquire skill by experimenting on your persons." Every one present laughed at the exordium (and there the matter dropped).

 (9) Or, "the pretty exordium...  now in course of composition.  He     must at all hazards avoid the suspicion of having picked up any     crumb of learning from anybody; how can he help therefore     beginning his speech thus?"  (10) Or, "scientific experts."  (11) Al.  "Just as if one seeking the office of state physician were to     begin with a like exordium."  {armoseie} = "it would be consistent     (with what has gone before)."  (12) Schneider cf.  Plat.  "Laws," iv.  720 A; "Gorg."  456 A; and for     "the parish doctor," "Polit."  259 A; Arist.  "Acharn."  1030.   

Presently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that he was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still at pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to attach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to cure him of that defect, proceeded.

Soc. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the harp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like accomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by themselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they must sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things and enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of those teachers in everything, as though they themselves could not otherwise become famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become eminent politically as orators and statesmen, (13) there are some who cannot see why they should not be able to do all that politics demand, at a moment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any preliminary pains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear that the latter concerns must be more difficult of achievement than the former, in proportion as there are more competitors in the field but fewer who reach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to say that a more sustained effort of attention is needed on the part of those who embark upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called for.

 (13) Or, more lit.  "powerful in speech and action within the sphere of     politics."   

Such were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of their association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the philosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns of the discussion more readily but was now become a somewhat eager listener, he went to the saddler's shop alone, (14) and when Euthydemus was seated by his side the following conversation took place.

 (14) The question arises: how far is the conversation historical or     imaginary?   

Soc. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me, that you have made a large collection of the writings of "the wise," as they are called? (15)

 (15) Or, "have collected several works of our classical authors and     philosophers."   

Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on collecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.

Soc. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom rather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe gold and silver to be the means of making men better, but that the thoughts (16) of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.

 (16) Lit.  "gnomes," maxims, sententiae.  Cf.  Aristot.  "Rhet."  ii.  21.   

And Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he to himself, "In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the acquisition of wisdom." But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased with the praise, continued.

Soc. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you collect books?

And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why, the prescriptions (17) of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large library by themselves.

 (17) {suggrammata}, "medical treatises."  See Aristot.  "Eth."  x.  9, 21.   

No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).

Soc. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of well-stored wit and judgment. (18)

 (18) Or, "To be that implies a considerable store of well-packed     wisdom."   

I have no such ambition (he replied).

Soc. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus? (19)

 (19) Of Cyrene (cf.  Plat.  "Theaet."  ) taught Plato.  Diog.  Laert.  ii.  8,     19.   

Euth. No, nor yet a mathematician.

Soc. Then do you wish to be an astronomer? (20) or (as the youth signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist? (21) (he asked), for I am told you have the entire works of Homer in your possession. (22)

 (20) Cf.  below, IV.  vii.  4.  (21) See "Symp."  iii.  6; Plat.  "Ion."  (22) See Jowett, "Plato," i.  229; Grote, "Plato," i.  455.   

Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a very exact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they are empty-pated creatures enough themselves. (23)

 (23) Or, "are simply perfect in the art of reciting epic poetry, but     are apt to be the veriest simpletons themselves."   

At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant to that excellence through which men become statesmen and administrators fit to rule and apt to benefit (24) the rest of the world and themselves?

 (24)  Or, "statesmen, and economists, and rules, and benefactors of     the rest of the world and themselves."   

Yes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire—beyond measure.

Upon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the object of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the arts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled "royal"; but (he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in these matters without being just and upright? (25)

 (25) Just, {dikaios} = upright, righteous.  Justice, {dikaiosune} =     social uprightness = righteousness, N.  T.  To quote a friend: "The     Greek {dikaios} combines the active dealing out of justice with     the self-reflective idea of preserving justice in our conduct,     which is what we mean by 'upright.'  " 

Euth. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness it is impossible to be a good citizen.

No doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?

Euth. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers as an upright man.

And have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?

Euth. To be sure they have.

Soc. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his, should he not?

I see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works of righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of unrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that sort within reach of eye and ear every day.

Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side, (26) and on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us to be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to the account of W?

 (26) The letter R (to stand for Right, Righteous, Upright, Just).  The     letter W (to stand for Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).   

By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.

Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and continued.

Soc. Lying exists among men, does it not?

Euth. Certainly.

To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).

Euth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.

Soc. Deceit too is not uncommon?

Euth. By no means.

Soc. To which side shall we place deceit?

Euth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.

Soc. Well, and chicanery (27) or mischief of any sort?

 (27) Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari, Sturz); al.  {kleptein}, Stob.   

Euth. That too.

Soc. And the enslavement of free-born men? (28)

 (28) Or, "the kidnapping of men into slavery."  {to andrapodizesthai} =     the reduction of a free-born man to a state of slavery.  Slavery     itself ({douleia}) being regarded as the normal condition of a     certain portion of the human race and not in itself immoral.   

Euth. That too.

Soc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?

It would be monstrous (he replied).

Soc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to say that he is doing wrong?

Euth. By no means.

Soc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?

Euth. That would be all fair and right also.

Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what is right?

Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question to the case of friends.

Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right?

Euth. Apparently.

Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a new definition—that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves us to be as straightforward as possible. (29)

 (29) Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary."   

I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).

So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act of fraud? (30)

 (30) Cf.  "Hell."  IV.  iii.  10; "Cyrop."  I.  vi.  31.   

On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).

Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which account shall we set down this fraud?

Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.

Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and you are afraid he will make away with himself—accordingly you rob him of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the theft?

Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.

Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?

Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my former statement. (31)

 (31) See above, I.  ii.  44 ({anatithemai}).   

Soc. Allow you! Of course you may—anything rather than make a false entry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful—to do so voluntarily or unintentionally?

Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I first supposed them. (32) Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.

 (32) Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first     conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be     twisted topsy-turvy."   

Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar? (33)

 (33) {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}—a doctrine and a knowledge     of the Just.   

Euth. That is my opinion.

Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters (34)—he who intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?

 (34) Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."   

Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell or read correctly whenever he chooses.

Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the involuntary offender is an illiterate? (35)

 (35) Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer     intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but     he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"   

Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.

Soc. And which of the two knows what is right—he who intentionally lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously? (36)

 (36) Or, Soc.  And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what     is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?  Euth.  Clearly he does.   

Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.

Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such knowledge? (37)

 (37)  Or, Soc.  It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the     {episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such     {episteme}?  Euth.  Yes.  Soc.  And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more     righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}?  See Plat.  "Hipp.  min."  ; Arist.  "Eth.  Eud."  VI.  v.  7.   

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?

Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail of my own admission. (38)

 (38) Lit.  "Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also,     heaven knows how."  See Jowett, "Plato," ii.  p.  416 (ed.  2).   

Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards the east," and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running up a column of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that, now more, now less—what do you think of such a man?

Euth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.

Soc. And you know the appellation given to certain people—"slavish," (39) or, "little better than a slave?"

 (39) {andropododeis}, which has the connotation of mental dulness, and     a low order of intellect, cf.  "boorish," "rustic," "loutish,"     ("pariah," conceivably).  "Slavish," "servile," with us connote     moral rather than intellectual deficiency, I suppose.  Hence it is     impossible to preserve the humour of the Socratic argument.  See     Newman, op.  cit.  i.  107.   

Euth. I do.

Soc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to whom it is applied?

Euth. Clearly of their ignorance.

Soc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?

Euth. No, certainly not.

Soc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?

Euth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.

Soc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?

Euth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better than slaves."

Soc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of the beautiful, the good, the just? (40)

 (40) Cf.  Goethe's "Im Ganzen Guten Schonen resolut zu leben."   

It is, in my opinion (he replied).

Soc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the imputation of being slaves?

Euth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that at any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to be taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and goodness his pursuit. (41) So that now you may well imagine my despair when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.

 (41) {tes kalokagathias}, the virtue of the {kalos te kagathos}—     nobility of soul.  Cf.  above, I.  vi.  14.   

Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?

Yes, certainly; twice (said he).

Soc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple: {GNOMI SEAUTON}—KNOW THYSELF?

Euth. I did.

Soc. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?

I can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the world did I know?

Soc. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own name and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like the would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he has got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the beast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and how it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in reference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man in like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's requirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?

Euth. Yes, so it strikes me: he who knows not his own ability knows not himself.

Soc. And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge men meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves with many evils? Because, the man who knows himself knows what is advantageous to himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by doing what he knows, he provides himself with what he needs and so does well; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what he knows not, he avoids mistakes and thereby mishaps. And having now a test to gauge other human beings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with good and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is mistaken as to his own capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of mankind and all human matters else; he neither knows what he wants, nor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; and being all abroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in what is ill.

Again, he that knows what he is doing through the success of his performance attains to fame and honour; his peers and co-mates are glad to make use of him, whilst his less successful neighbours, failing in their affairs, are anxious to secure his advice, his guidance, his protection; (42) they place their hopes of happiness in him, and for all these causes (43) single him out as the chief object of their affection. He, on the contrary, who knows not what he does, who chooses amiss and fails in what he puts his hands to, not only incurs loss and suffers chastisement through his blunders, but step by step loses reputation and becomes a laughing-stock, and in the end is doomed to a life of dishonour and contempt.

 (42) Cf.  Dante, "Tu duca, tu maestro, tu signore."  (43) Reading, {dia panta tauta}, or if {dia tauta}, translate "and     therefore."   

What is true of individuals is true also of communities. (44) That state which in ignorance of its power goes to war with a stronger than itself ends by being uprooted or else reduced to slavery.

 (44) Or, more lit.  "A law which applies, you will observe, to bodies     politic."   

Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the precept KNOW THYSELF cannot be too highly valued; but what is the application? What the starting-point of self-examination? I look to you for an explanation, if you would kindly give one. (45)

 (45) Or, "at what point to commence the process of self-inspection?  —     there is the mystery.  I look to you, if you are willing, to     interpret it."   

Well (replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction between good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?

Why, yes, to be sure (replied the youth); for without that much discernment I should indeed be worse than any slave. (46)

 (46) Lit.  "if I did not know even that."   

Come then (said he), do you give me an explanation of the things so termed.

That is fortunately not hard (replied the youth). First of all, health in itself I hold to be a good, and disease in itself an evil; and in the next place the sources of either of those aforenamed, meats and drinks, and habits of life, (47) I regard as good or evil according as they contribute either to health or to disease.

 (47) Or, "pursuits and occupations"; "manners and customs." 

Soc. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?

And when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source of good?

Why, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for instance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage or other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to spare—when those who owing to their health and strength take a part in the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind—as hors de combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness—are saved.

Euth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages to be got from strength and lost through weakness.

Soc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather than evil?

Euth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom, (48) Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good; since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better than a fool.

 (48) See above, III.  ix.  5.  Here {sophia} is not = {sophrosune}.   

Soc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus, (49) how he was seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave, and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while endeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among barbarians and again enslaved?

 (49) See Ovid.  "Met."  viii.  159 foll.  , 261 foll.  ; Hygin.  "Fab."  39,     40; Diod.  Sic.  iv.  79; Paus.  vii.  4.  6.   

Yes, I know the old story (he answered). (50)

 (50) Or, "Ah yes, of course; the tale is current."   

Soc. Or have you not heard of the "woes of Palamedes," (51) that commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him and slew him?

 (51) See Virg.  "Aen."  ii.  90; Hygin.  105; Philostr.  "Her."  x.   

Euth. That tale also is current.

Soc. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on account of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his court enslaved? (52)

 (52) Cf.  Herod.  iii.  129.   

Well, prosperity, well-being (53) (he exclaimed), must surely be a blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?

 (53) {to eudaimonein}, "happiness."  Cf.  Herod.  i.  86.   

It might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in itself a compound of other questionable blessings.

Euth. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can possibly be questionable?

None (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these components beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything else of that kind?

Euth. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would happiness be without these?

Soc. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest sources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their fair faces at the hand of admirers driven to distraction (54) by the sight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to essay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how many, rendered effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted against and destroyed! (55) how many through fame and political power have suffered a world of woe!

 (54) Cf.  Plat.  "Rep."  vii.  517 D; "Phaedr." 249 D.  (55) e.g.  Alcibiades.   

Well (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness, I must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in prayer. (56)

 (56) See above for Socrates' own form of supplication.   

Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through excessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to examine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to direct, is democratically constituted, (57) of course you know what a democracy is.

 (57) Or, "popularly governed."   

Euth. I presume I do, decidedly.

Soc. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without knowing who the people are?

Euth. Certainly not.

Soc. And whom do you consider to be the people?

Euth. The poor citizens, I should say.

Soc. Then you know who the poor are, of course?

Euth. Of course I do.

Soc. I presume you also know who the rich are?

Euth. As certainly as I know who are the poor.

Soc. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?

Euth. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their necessaries, (58) and by rich those who have more means than sufficient for all their needs.

 (58) Al.  "who cannot contribute their necessary quota to the taxes     (according to the census)."   

Soc. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only find this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of it; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?

I have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied Euthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and despotic rulers being driven by want to commit misdeeds like the veriest paupers.

Then, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class these same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of scant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?

Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this admission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a little more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he went away crestfallen, in an agony of self-contempt, persuaded that he was verily and indeed no better than a slave.

Amongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many refused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as dolts and dullards. (59) But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that, in order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate as much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some necessity, he never left him—in some points even imitating him in his habits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the young man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the simplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held to be needful to know or important to practise.

 (59) Or, "as people of dull intelligence and sluggish temperament."  Cf.  Plat.  "Gorg."  488 A.   

III

It may be inferred that Socrates was in no hurry for those who were with him to discover capacities for speech and action or as inventive geniuses, (1) without at any rate a well-laid foundation of self-control. (2) For those who possessed such abilities without these same saving virtues would, he believed, only become worse men with greater power for mischief. His first object was to instil into those who were with him a wise spirit in their relation to the gods. (3) That such was the tenor of his conversation in dealing with men may be seen from the narratives of others who were present on some particular occasion. (4) I confine myself to a particular discussion with Euthydemus at which I was present.

 (1) Or, "as speakers" (see ch.  vi.  below), "and men of action" (see     ch.  v.  below), "or as masters of invention" (see ch.  vii.  below).  (2) Or, "but as prior to those excellences must be engrafted in them     {sophrosune} (the virtues of temperance and sanity of soul)."  (3) Lit.  "His first object and endeavour was to make those who were     with him {sophronas} (sound of soul) as regards the gods."  (4) Reading after Herbst, Cobet, etc., {diegountai}, or if vulg.  {diegounto}, translate, "from the current accounts penned during     his lifetime by the other witnesses."  For {alloi} see K.  Joel, op.  cit.  pp.  15, 23; above, "Mem."  I.  iv.  1.   

Socrates said: (5) Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever struck you to observe what tender pains the gods have taken to furnish man with all his needs?

 (5) For the subject matter of this "teleological" chapter, see above,     I.  iv.  ; K.  Joel, op.  cit.  Appendix, p.  547 foll.  in ref.  to     Dummler's views.   

Euth. No indeed, I cannot say that it has ever struck me.

Well (Socrates continued), you do not need to be reminded that, in the first place, we need light, and with light the gods supply us.

Euth. Most true, and if we had not got it we should, as far as our own eyes could help us, be like men born blind.

Soc. And then, again, seeing that we stand in need of rest and relaxation, they bestow upon us "the blessed balm of silent night." (6)

 (6) {kalliston anapauterion}.  The diction throughout is "poetical."   

Yes (he answered), we are much beholden for that boon.

Soc. Then, forasmuch as the sun in his splendour makes manifest to us the hours of the day and bathes all things in brightness, but anon night in her darkness obliterates distinctions, have they not displayed aloft the starry orbs, which inform us of the watches of the night, whereby we can accomplish many of our needs? (7)

 (7) e.g.  for temple orientation see Dr. Penrose quoted by Norman     Lockyer, "Nature," August 31.  1893.   

It is so (he answered).

Soc. And let us not forget that the moon herself not only makes clear to us the quarters of the night, but of the month also?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And what of this: that whereas we need nutriment, this too the heavenly powers yield us? Out of earth's bosom they cause good to spring up (8) for our benefit; and for our benefit provide appropriate seasons to furnish us in turn not only with the many and diverse objects of need, but with the sources also of our joy and gladness? (9)

 (8) Cf.  Plat.  "Laws," 747 D.  (9) Or, "pleasure."   

Yes (he answered eagerly), these things bear token truly to a love for man. (10)

 (10) Cf.  Plat.  "Laws," 713 D; "Symp."  189 D.  "These things are signs     of a beneficient regard for man."   

Soc. Well, and what of another priceless gift, that of water, which conspires with earth and the seasons to give both birth and increase to all things useful to us; nay, which helps to nurture our very selves, and commingling with all that feeds us, renders it more digestible, more wholesome, and more pleasant to the taste; and mark you in proportion to the abundance of our need the superabundance of its supply. What say you concerning such a boon?

Euth. In this again I see a sign of providential care.

Soc. And then the fact that the same heavenly power has provided us with fire (11)—our assistant against cold, our auxiliary in darkness, our fellow-workman in every art and every instrument which for the sake of its utility mortal man may invent or furnish himself withal. What of this, since, to put it compendiously, there is nothing serviceable to the life of man worth speaking of but owes its fabrication to fire? (12)

 (11) Lit.  "and then the fact that they made provision for us of even     fire"; the credit of this boon, according to Hesiod, being due to     Prometheus.  (12) Or, "no life-aiding appliance worthy of the name."   

Euth. Yes, a transcendent instance of benevolent design. (13)

 (13) Or, "Yes, that may be called an extreme instance of the divine     'philanthropy.'  " Cf.  Cic.  "de N.  D."  ii.  62.   

Soc. Again, consider the motions of the Sun, (14) how when he has turned him about in winter (15) he again draws nigh to us, ripening some fruits, and causing others whose time is past to dry up; how when he has fulfilled his work he comes no closer, but turns away as if in fear to scorch us to our hurt unduly; and again, when he has reached a point where if he should prolong his retreat we should plainly be frozen to death with cold, note how he turns him about and resumes his approach, traversing that region of the heavens where he may shed his genial influence best upon us.

 (14) A single MS. inserts a passage {to de kai era...  'Anekphraston}.  (15) i.e.  as we say, "after the winter solstice."   

Yes, upon my word (he answered), these occurrences bear the impress of being so ordered for the sake of man.

Soc. And then, again, it being manifest that we could not endure either scorching heat or freezing cold if they came suddenly upon us, note how gradually the sun approaches, and how gradually recedes, so that we fail to notice how we come at last to either extreme. (16)

 (16) Or, "note the gradual approach and gradual recession of the sun-     god, so gradual that we reach either extreme in a manner     imperceptibly, and before we are aware of its severity."   

For my part (he replied), the question forces itself upon my mind, whether the gods have any other occupation save only to minister to man; and I am only hindered from saying so, because the rest of animals would seem to share these benefits along with man.

Soc. Why, to be sure; and is it not plain that these animals themselves are born and bred for the sake of man? At any rate, no living creature save man derives so many of his enjoyments from sheep and goats, horses and cattle and asses, and other animals. He is more dependent, I should suppose, on these than even on plants and vegetables. At any rate, equally with these latter they serve him as means of subsistence or articles of commerce; indeed, a large portion of the human family do not use the products of the soil as food at all, but live on the milk and cheese and flesh of their flocks and herds, whilst all men everywhere tame and domesticate the more useful kinds of animals, and turn them to account as fellow-workers in war and for other purposes.

Yes, I cannot but agree with what you say (he answered), when I see that animals so much stronger than man become so subservient to his hand that he can use them as he lists.

Soc. And as we reflect on the infinite beauty and utility and the variety of nature, what are we to say of the fact that man has been endowed with sensibilities which correspond with this diversity, whereby we take our fill of every blessing; (17) or, again, this implanted faculty of reasoning, which enables us to draw inferences concerning the things which we perceive, and by aid of memory to understand how each set of things may be turned to our good, and to devise countless contrivances with a view to enjoying the good and repelling the evil; or lastly, when we consider the faculty bestowed upon us of interpretative speech, by which we are enabled to instruct one another, and to participate in all the blessings fore-named: to form societies, to establish laws, and to enter upon a civilised existence (18)—what are we to think?

 (17) Or, "Again, when we consider how many beautiful objects there are     serviceable to man, and yet how unlike they are to one another,     the fact that man has been endowed with senses adapted to each     class of things, and so has access to a world of happiness."  (18) Cf.  Aristot.  "Pol."  III.  ix.  5.   

Euth. Yes, Socrates, decidedly it would appear that the gods do manifest a great regard, nay, a tender care, towards mankind.

Soc. Well, and what do you make of the fact that where we are powerless to take advantageous forethought for our future, at this stage they themselves lend us their co-operation, imparting to the inquirer through divination knowledge of events about to happen, and instructing him by what means they may best be turned to good account?

Euth. Ay, and you, Socrates, they would seem to treat in a more friendly manner still than the rest of men, if, without waiting even to be inquired of by you, they show you by signs beforehand what you must, and what you must not do. (19)

 (19) See above, I.  iv.  14, for a parallel to the train of thought on     the part of Aristodemus "the little," and of Euthydemus; and for     Socrates' {daimonion}, see above; Grote, "Plato," i.  400.   

Soc. Yes, and you will discover for yourself the truth of what I say, if, without waiting to behold the outward and visible forms (20) of the gods themselves, you will be content to behold their works; and with these before you, to worship and honour the Divine authors of them. (21) I would have you reflect that the very gods themselves suggest this teaching. (22) Not one of these but gives us freely of his blessings; yet they do not step from behind their veil in order to grant one single boon. (23) And pre-eminently He who orders and holds together the universe, (24) in which are all things beautiful and good; (25) who fashions and refashions it to never-ending use unworn, keeping it free from sickness or decay, (26) so that swifter than thought it ministers to his will unerringly—this God is seen to perform the mightiest operations, but in the actual administration of the same abides himself invisible to mortal ken. Reflect further, this Sun above our heads, so visible to all—as we suppose—will not suffer man to regard him too narrowly, but should any essay to watch him with a shameless stare he will snatch away their power of vision. And if the gods themselves are thus unseen, so too shall you find their ministers to be hidden also; from the height of heaven above the thunderbolt is plainly hurled, and triumphs over all that it encounters, yet it is all-invisible, no eye may detect its coming or its going at the moment of its swoop. The winds also are themselves unseen, though their works are manifest, and through their approach we are aware of them. And let us not forget, the soul of man himself, which if aught else human shares in the divine—however manifestly enthroned within our bosom, is as wholly as the rest hidden from our gaze. These things you should lay to mind, and not despise the invisible ones, but learn to recognise their power, as revealed in outward things, and to know the divine influence. (27)

 (20) Cf.  Cic.  "de N.  D."  I.  xii.  31; Lactantius, "de Ira," xi.  13.  (21) See L.  Dindorf ad loc.  (ed.  Ox.  1862), {theous}; G.  Sauppe, vol.  iii.  "An.  crit."  p.  xxix; R.  Kuhner; C.  Schenkl.  (22) i.e.  "that man must walk by faith."  For {upodeiknunai} cf.  "Econ."  xii.  18.  (23) Schneid.  cf.  Plat.  "Crat."  396.  (24) Or, "the co-ordinator and container of the universe."  (25) Or, "in whom all beauty and goodness is."  (26) Cf.  "Cyrop."  VIII.  vii.  22; above, I.  iv.  13.  (27) {to daimonion}, the divinity.   

Nay, Socrates (replied Euthydemus), there is no danger I shall turn a deaf ear to the divine influence even a little; of that I am not afraid, but I am out of heart to think that no soul of man may ever requite the kindness of the gods with fitting gratitude.

Be not out of heart because of that (he said); you know what answer the god at Delphi makes to each one who comes asking "how shall I return thanks to heaven?" —"According to the law and custom of your city"; and this, I presume, is law and custom everywhere that a man should please the gods with offerings according to the ability which is in him. (28) How then should a man honour the gods with more beautiful or holier honour than by doing what they bid him? but he must in no wise slacken or fall short of his ability, for when a man so does, it is manifest, I presume, that at the moment he is not honouring the gods. You must then honour the gods, not with shortcoming but according to your ability; and having so done, be of good cheer and hope to receive the greatest blessings. For where else should a man of sober sense look to receive great blessings if not from those who are able to help him most, and how else should he hope to obtain them save by seeking to please his helper, and how may he hope to please his helper better than by yielding him the amplest obedience?

 (28) Or, "and that law, I presume, is universal which says, Let a     man," etc.; and for the maxim see above; "Anab."  III.  ii.  9.   

By such words—and conduct corresponding to his words—did Socrates mould and fashion the hearts of his companions, making them at once more devout and more virtuous. (29)

 (29) Or, "sounder of soul and more temperate as well as more pious."   

IV

But indeed (1) with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made no secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of it, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behaviour to all, (2) and in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, whether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was a pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several occasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of the assembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an unconstitutional vote, (3) but ventured, on the side of the laws, to resist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have daunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some injunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for instance when they forbade his conversing with the young; (4) or again, when they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to be put to death, (5) he stood out single-handed on the ground that the injunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when he appeared as defendant in the suit instituted by Meletus, (6) notwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts to humour the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery and supplications contrary to the laws, (7) notwithstanding also that defendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such methods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of law which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection from the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges, (8) he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress them and live.

 (1) L.  Dindorf suspects  (SS.  1-6, {'Alla men...  pollakis}), ed.  Lips.  1872.  See also Praef.  to Ox.  ed.  p.  viii.  (2) Or, "by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the     eye of law and custom but positively helpful."  (3) See above, I.  i.  18; "Hell."  I.  vii.  14, 15; Grote, "H.  G."  viii.  272.  (4) See above, I.  ii.  35.  (5) Leon of Salamis.  See "Hell."  II.  iii.  39; Plat.  "Apol."  32 C;     Andoc.  "de Myst."  46.  (6) See above, I.  i.  1; Plat.  "Apol."  19 C.  (7) Kuhner cf.  Quintil.  VI.  i.  7: "Athenis affectus movere etiam per     praeconem prohibatur orator"; "Apol."  4; Plat.  "Apol."  38 D, E.  (8) See Grote, "H.  G."  viii.  p.  663 foll.   

These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis (9) on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge. (10)

 (9) For this famous person see Cob.  "Pros.  Xen."  s.  n.  ; Plat.  "Hipp.  maj."  148; Quint.  xii.  11, 21; Grote, "H.  G."  viii.  524.  (10) Or, "I can personally vouch for."   

Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to send him for the purpose: "People say," (11) he added, "that if a man wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way, (12) the world is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find such instruction."

 (11) L.  Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence     {phasi de tines...  didaxonton}.  See Kuhner ad loc.  For the     sentiment see Plat.  "Apol."  20 A.  (12) Cf.  "Cyrop."  II.  ii.  26; VIII.  iii.  38; also "Horsem."  iii.  5;     "Hunting," vii.  4.   

Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still repeating the same old talk, (13) Socrates, which I used to hear from you long ago?

 (13) This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys.  "Or."  III.  i.  109.  Cf.  Plat.  "Gorg."  490 E.   

Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge, (14) never say the same thing twice over on the same subject?

 (14) Or, "such is the breadth of your learning," {polumathes}.  Cf.  Plat.  "Hipp.  maj."   

To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all occasions.

What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and what is their order?" (15) I suppose you try to run off one string of letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic, "Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that of yesterday?

 (15) Cf.  "Econ."  viii.  14; Plat.  "Alc."  i.  113 A.   

Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself. However, to revert to justice (and uprightness), (16) I flatter myself I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any one else will be able to controvert.

 (16) Or, "on the topic of the just I have something to say at present     which," etc. 

By Hera! (17) (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered! (18) Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling; there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.

 (17) See above, I.  v.  5.  (18) Or, "what a panacea are you the inventor of"; lit.  "By Hera, you     have indeed discovered a mighty blessing, if juries are to cease     recording their verdicts 'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to cease     their wranglings on points of justice, their litigations, and     their party strifes; if states are to cease differing on matters     of right and wrong and appealing to the arbitrament of war."   

You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a single topic. (19)

 (19) See Plat.  "Gorg."  465 A.   

What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?

Hipp. And pray what is this theory (20) of yours on the subject? Let us have it in words.

 (20) {o logos}.   

Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than a word? (21)

 (21) Or, "is of greater evidential value," "ubi res adsunt, quid opus     est verbis?"   

Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer of right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.

Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing any other unjust and wrongful act?

No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).

Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong? (22)

 (22) Or, "is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous     behaviour?"   

Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.

Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of righteousness and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I assert that what is "lawful" is "just and righteous."

Do you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous terms?

Soc. I do.

I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful, nor what you mean by just. (23)

 (23) Lit.  "what sort of lawful or what sort of just is spoken of."   

Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?

Yes (he answered).

Soc. What do you take them to be?

Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.

Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be law-abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?

Hipp. Certainly.

Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who does what is unjust is unjust?

Hipp. Of course.

Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the lawless unjust?

Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them, which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and altering?

Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually undertaking war and then making peace again.

Most true (he answered).

Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm displayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?

No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).

Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the Lacedaemonians, (24) and do you understand that if he succeeded in giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws? And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity. "Concord among citizens"—that is the constant theme of exhortation emphasised by the councils of elders (25) and by the choice spirits of the community; (26) at all times and everywhere through the length and breadth of all Hellas it is an established law that the citizens be bound together by an oath of concord; (27) everywhere they do actually swear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote for the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players, or choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but simply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that state will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the citizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well administered nor a household well organised.

 (24) Cf.  "Pol.  Lac."  viii.  See Newman, op.  cit.  i.  396.  (25) Lit.  "the Gerousiai."  {S} or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.  (26) Lit.  "the best men."  {S} or {X S} speaks as an "aristocrat."  (27) Cf.  "Hell."  II.  iv.  43; Lys.  xxv.  21 foll.  ; Schneid.  cf.  Lycurg.  "u Leocr."  189.   

And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man have than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against penalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts unbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory. (28) It is to him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when seeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is trustworthy—he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to all alike their dues—to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace. They would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on his side. This is he to whom the allies (29) of his country will most confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to recompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore, is more sure of kindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude is fuller. (30) The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided, clearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go to war with; encompassed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his very character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before him hatred and hostility melt away.

 (28) Or, "ignorant of hostile, assured of favourable verdict."  (29) Lit.  "the Allies," e.g.  of Sparta or of Athens, etc.   (30) Lit.  "From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more     confidently expect the recompense of gratitude than from your     lover of the law?  and whom would one select as the recipient of     kindness rather than a man susceptible of gratitude?"   

And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary view, instruct us. (31)

 (31) For the style of this enconium (of the {nomimos}) cf.  "Ages."  i.  36; and for the "Socratic" reverence for law cf.  Plat.  "Crito."   

Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice. (32)

 (32) Lit.  "the just and upright," {tou dikaiou}.   

Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws? (33)

 (33) See Soph.  "Antig."  "Oed.  T."  865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.  ; Dem.  "de Cor."  317, 23; Aristot.  "Rhet."  I.  xiii.   

Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the same sense.

Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men made them?

Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men are not all of one speech? (34)

 (34) Or, "there would be difficulty of understanding each other, and a     babel of tongues."   

Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.

Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.

Soc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?

Yes, that too (he answered).

Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between parents and children?

Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be a law of God.

Now, why? (he asked).

Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered). (35)

 (35) Or, "as I perceive, it is not of universal application, some     transgress it."   

Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people do contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or avoiding it by violence.

Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?

Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget? (36)

 (36) Or, "in the propagation of the species than to produce     misbegotten children."   

Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?

Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock, but that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their bodies. (37) Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime has passed?

 (37) Cf.  Plat.  "Laws," viii.  839 A; Herbst, etc., cf.  Grotius, "de     Jure," ii.  5, xii.  4.   

Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.

Soc. And for the better—which?

Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.

Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime or have passed their prime is not good?

Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.

Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?

Hipp. No, that is not the right way.

Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to be?

Hipp. So it appears to me.

What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and ill born, if not these?

I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).

Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return good for good, and kindness with kindness?

Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.

Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those who love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness in my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain to me of his society?

Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an implication of divine authority; (38) that a law should in itself be loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a higher than human type of legislator.

 (38) Lit.  "Yes, upon my word, Socrates, all these cases look very like     (would seem to point to) the gods."   

Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?

Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God himself.

Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased that "the lawful" and "the just" should be synonymous? (39)

 (39) Or, "it is well pleasing also to the gods that what is lawful is     just and what is just is lawful."   

By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike, he helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just.

V

And now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him more vigorous in action. (1) In the first place, as befitted one whose creed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble performance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who had pre-eminently disciplined himself; (2) and in the next place by conversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self-restraint beyond all others. (3) Thus it was that he continued ever mindful himself, and was continually reminding all whom he encountered, of matters conducive to virtue; as the following discussion with Euthydemus, which has come to my knowledge, (4) will serve to illustrate—the topic of the discussion being self-command.

 (1) Lit.  "more practical," i.e.  more energetic and effective.  (2) "If any one might claim to be a prince of ascetics, it was     Socrates; such was the ineffaceable impression left on the minds     of his associates."  (3) Or, "he stimulated in these same companions a spirit of self-     restraint beyond all else."  (4) Or, "which I can vouch for."   

Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?

I cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).

Soc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the pleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?

Certainly not (he answered).

Soc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour of freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you doing the like seems a loss of freedom?

Most decidedly (he answered).

Soc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are the reverse of free? (5)

 (5) Or, "incontinency is illiberal."   

Euth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.

Soc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely hindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to do what is most shameful?

Euth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from the other.

Soc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at once put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?

Euth. Goodness knows, they must be the very worst of masters.

Soc. And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?

I should say (he answered) slavery to the worst masters.

It would seem then (pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is bound over to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?

So it appears to be (the other answered).

Soc. And does it not appear to you that this same beldame incontinence shuts out wisdom, which is the best of all things, (6) from mankind, and plunges them into the opposite? Does it not appear to you that she hinders men from attending to things which will be of use and benefit, and from learning to understand them; that she does so by dragging them away to things which are pleasant; and often though they are well aware of the good and of the evil, she amazes and confounds (7) their wits and makes them choose the worse in place of the better?

 (6) "Wisdom, the greatest good which men can possess."  (7) Schneid.  cf.  Plat.  "Protag."  355 A; and "Symp."  iv.  23.   

Yes, so it comes to pass (he answered).

Soc. And (8) soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty? Who has less claim to this than the incontinent man? The works of the temperate spirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it, diametrically opposed?

 (8) "And if this be so concerning wisdom, {sophia}, what of     {sophrasune}, soundness of soul—sobriety?"   

That too, I admit (he answered).

Soc. If this then be so concerning these virtues, (9) what with regard to carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us? Can anything more seriously militate against these than this same incontinence?

 (9) Or add, "If this be so concerning not wisdom only, but concerning     temperance and soundness of soul, what," etc. 

Nothing that I can think of (he replied).

Soc. And can worse befall a man, think you? Can he be subjected to a more baleful influence than that which induces him to choose what is hurtful in place of what is helpful; which cajoles him to devote himself to the evil and to neglect the good; which forces him, will he nill he, to do what every man in his sober senses would shrink from and avoid?

I can imagine nothing worse (he replied).

Soc. Self-control, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the cause of opposite effects upon mankind to those of its own opposite, the want of self-control?

Euth. It is to be supposed so.

Soc. And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very worst, will be the very best of things?

Euth. That is the natural inference.

Soc. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self-control were the best thing a man could have?

It does indeed, Socrates (he answered).

Soc. But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one fact?

What fact? (he asked).

Soc. That, after all, incontinency is powerless to bring us to that realm of sweetness which some look upon (10) as her peculiar province; it is not incontinency but self-control alone which has the passport to highest pleasures.

 (10) Or, "which we are apt to think of as."   

In what way? (he asked). How so?

Why, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer us to resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual appetite, or want of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to true pleasure in eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet repose and blissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and endure till each particular happiness is at the flood) (11)—it comes to this: by incontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the more obvious and constantly recurring pleasures. (12) To self-control, which alone enables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs the power to give us any pleasure worth remembering in these common cases.

 (11) Or, "at its season."  Lit.  "is as sweet as possible."  (12) Or, "from tasting to any extent worth speaking of the most     necessary and all-pervading sources of happiness."   

You speak the words of truth (13) (he answered).

 (13) Lit.  "What you say is absolutely and entirely true" (the "vraie     verite" of the matter).   

Soc. Furthermore, (14) if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate his enemies—which things are the sources not only of advantage but of deepest satisfaction (15)—to the continent and self-controlled it is given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in the pleasure which is nearest to hand.

 (14) Or, "But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noble     study or of such accomplishments as shall enable," etc.   (15) Or, "of the highest pleasures."   

Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with virtue.

And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to gratify his sense of pleasure, (16) is he better than the silliest of cattle? (17)... But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and make selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately the good and holding aloof from the evil. (18) Thus (he added) it is that a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness, thus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion. (19) The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming together and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things ({dialegein}) according to their kinds. (20) A man then is bound to prepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it beyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to excellence, this will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a master in debate. (21)

 (16) Or, "and seeks by hook and by crook to do what is pleasantest."  (17) i.e.  he becomes an animal "feeding a blind life within the     brain."  (18) Or, "selecting the ore and repudiating the dross."  Kuhner cf.  Plat.  "Laws," v.  735 B.  (19) Or, "draws nearer to happiness and perfection, and is most     capable of truth-disclosing conversation."  Cf.  Plat.  "Apol."  41:     "What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the     leaders of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus,     or numberless others, men and women too!  What infinite delight     would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions!"  (Jowett).  (20) For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai}, cf.  Grote, "H.  G."  viii.  590.  (21) Cf.  Plat.  "Rep."  534 D; "Phaedr." 252 E; "Crat."  390 C;     "Statesm."  286 D foll.   

VI

At this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered this greater "dialectic" capacity among his intimates. (1) He held firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble themselves and cause others to stumble also. (2) It was for this reason that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into the true nature of things that are. (3) It would be a long business certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly represented as follows.

 (1) Lit.  "essayed to make those who were with him more potent in     dialectic."  (2) Or, "Socrates believed that any one who knew the nature of     anything would be able to let others into his secret; but, failing     that knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blind     leaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others to     stumble also."  (3) Or add, "'What is this among things?  and what is its definition?'  —such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought an     answer."