REFLECTIONS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, BY THE DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD

I. On Confidence.

Though sincerity and confidence have many points of resemblance, they have yet many points of difference.

Sincerity is an openness of heart, which shows us what we are, a love of truth, a dislike to deception, a wish to compensate our faults and to lessen them by the merit of confessing them.

Confidence leaves us less liberty, its rules are stricter, it requires more prudence and reticence, and we are not always free to give it. It relates not only to ourselves, since our interests are often mixed up with those of others; it requires great delicacy not to expose our friends in exposing ourselves, not to draw upon their goodness to enhance the value of what we give.

Confidence always pleases those who receive it. It is a tribute we pay to their merit, a deposit we commit to their trust, a pledge which gives them a claim upon us, a kind of dependence to which we voluntarily submit. I do not wish from what I have said to depreciate confidence, so necessary to man. It is in society the link between acquaintance and friendship. I only wish to state its limits to make it true and real. I would that it was always sincere, always discreet, and that it had neither weakness nor interest. I know it is hard to place proper limits on being taken into all our friends' confidence, and taking them into all ours.

Most frequently we make confidants from vanity, a love of talking, a wish to win the confidence of others, and make an exchange of secrets.

Some may have a motive for confiding in us, towards whom we have no motive for confiding. With them we discharge the obligation in keeping their secrets and trusting them with small confidences.

Others whose fidelity we know trust nothing to us, but we confide in them by choice and inclination.

We should hide from them nothing that concerns us, we should always show them with equal truth, our virtues and our vices, without exaggerating the one or diminishing the other. We should make it a rule never to have half confidences. They always embarrass those who give them, and dissatisfy those who receive them. They shed an uncertain light on what we want hidden, increase curiosity, entitling the recipients to know more, giving them leave to consider themselves free to talk of what they have guessed. It is far safer and more honest to tell nothing than to be silent when we have begun to tell. There are other rules to be observed in matters confided to us, all are important, to all prudence and trust are essential.

Everyone agrees that a secret should be kept intact, but everyone does not agree as to the nature and importance of secresy. Too often we consult ourselves as to what we should say, what we should leave unsaid. There are few permanent secrets, and the scruple against revealing them will not last for ever.

With those friends whose truth we know we have the closest intimacy. They have always spoken unreservedly to us, we should always do the same to them. They know our habits and connexions, and see too clearly not to perceive the slightest change. They may have elsewhere learnt what we have promised not to tell. It is not in our power to tell them what has been entrusted to us, though it might tend to their interest to know it. We feel as confident of them as of ourselves, and we are reduced to the hard fate of losing their friendship, which is dear to us, or of being faithless as regards a secret. This is doubtless the hardest test of fidelity, but it should not move an honest man; it is then that he can sacrifice himself to others. His first duty is to rigidly keep his trust in its entirety. He should not only control and guard his and his voice, but even his lighter talk, so that nothing be seen in his conversation or manner that could direct the curiosity of others towards that which he wishes to conceal.

We have often need of strength and prudence wherewith to oppose the exigencies of most of our friends who make a claim on our confidence, and seek to know all about us. We should never allow them to acquire this unexceptionable right. There are accidents and circumstances which do not fall in their cognizance; if they complain, we should endure their complaints and excuse ourselves with gentleness, but if they are still unreasonable, we should sacrifice their friendship to our duty, and choose between two inevitable evils, the one reparable, the other irreparable.

II. On Difference of Character.

Although all the qualities of mind may be united in a great genius, yet there are some which are special and peculiar to him; his views are unlimited; he always acts uniformly and with the same activity; he sees distant objects as if present; he comprehends and grasps the greatest, sees and notices the smallest matters; his thoughts are elevated, broad, just and intelligible. Nothing escapes his observation, and he often finds truth in spite of the obscurity that hides her from others.

A lofty mind always thinks nobly, it easily creates vivid, agreeable, and natural fancies, places them in their best light, clothes them with all appropriate adornments, studies others' tastes, and clears away from its own thoughts all that is useless and disagreeable.

A clever, pliant, winning mind knows how to avoid and overcome difficulties. Bending easily to what it wants, it understands the inclination and temper it is dealing with, and by managing their interests it advances and establishes its own.

A well regulated mind sees all things as they should be seen, appraises them at their proper value, turns them to its own advantage, and adheres firmly to its own opinions as it knows all their force and weight.

A difference exists between a working mind and a business-like mind. We can undertake business without turning it to our own interest. Some are clever only in what does not concern them, and the reverse in all that does. There are others again whose cleverness is limited to their own business, and who know how to turn everything to their own advantage.

It is possible to have a serious turn of mind, and yet to talk pleasantly and cheerfully. This class of mind is suited to all persons in all times of life. Young persons have usually a cheerful and satirical turn, untempered by seriousness, thus often making themselves disagreeable.

No part is easier to play than that of being always pleasant; and the applause we sometimes receive in censuring others is not worth being exposed to the chance of offending them when they are out of temper.

Satire is at once the most agreeable and most dangerous of mental qualities. It always pleases when it is refined, but we always fear those who use it too much, yet satire should be allowed when unmixed with spite, and when the person satirised can join in the satire.

It is unfortunate to have a satirical turn without affecting to be pleased or without loving to jest. It requires much adroitness to continue satirical without falling into one of these extremes.

Raillery is a kind of mirth which takes possession of the imagination, and shows every object in an absurd light; wit combines more or less softness or harshness.

There is a kind of refined and flattering raillery that only hits the faults that persons admit, which understands how to hide the praise it gives under the appearance of blame, and shows the good while feigning a wish to hide it.

An acute mind and a cunning mind are very dissimilar. The first always pleases; it is unfettered, it perceives the most delicate and sees the most imperceptible matters. A cunning spirit never goes straight, it endeavours to secure its object by byeways and short cuts. This conduct is soon found out, it always gives rise to distrust and never reaches greatness.

There is a difference between an ardent and a brilliant mind, a fiery spirit travels further and faster, while a brilliant mind is sparkling, attractive, accurate.

Gentleness of mind is an easy and accommodating manner which always pleases when not insipid.

A mind full of details devotes itself to the management and regulation of the smallest particulars it meets with. This distinction is usually limited to little matters, yet it is not absolutely incompatible with greatness, and when these two qualities are united in the same mind they raise it infinitely above others.

The expression "Bel Esprit" is much perverted, for all that one can say of the different kinds of mind meet together in the "Bel Esprit." Yet as the epithet is bestowed on an infinite number of bad poets and tedious authors, it is more often used to ridicule than to praise.

There are yet many other epithets for the mind which mean the same thing, the difference lies in the tone and manner of saying them, but as tones and manner cannot appear in writing I shall not go into distinctions I cannot explain. Custom explains this in saying that a man has wit, has much wit, that he is a great wit; there are tones and manners which make all the difference between phrases which seem all alike on paper, and yet express a different order of mind.

So we say that a man has only one kind of wit, that he has several, that he has every variety of wit.

One can be a fool with much wit, and one need not be a fool even with very little wit.

To have much mind is a doubtful expression. It may mean every class of mind that can be mentioned, it may mean none in particular. It may mean that he talks sensibly while he acts foolishly. We may have a mind, but a narrow one. A mind may be fitted for some things, not for others. We may have a large measure of mind fitted for nothing, and one is often inconvenienced with much mind; still of this kind of mind we may say that it is sometimes pleasing in society.

Though the gifts of the mind are infinite, they can, it seems to me, be thus classified.

There are some so beautiful that everyone can see and feel their beauty.

There are some lovely, it is true, but which are wearisome.

There are some which are lovely, which all the world admire, but without knowing why.

There are some so refined and delicate that few are capable even of remarking all their beauties.

There are others which, though imperfect, yet are produced with such skill, and sustained and managed with such sense and grace, that they even deserve to be admired.

III. On Taste.

Some persons have more wit than taste, others have more taste than wit. There is greater vanity and caprice in taste than in wit.

The word taste has different meanings, which it is easy to mistake. There is a difference between the taste which in certain objects has an attraction for us, and the taste that makes us understand and distinguish the qualities we judge by.

We may like a comedy without having a sufficiently fine and delicate taste to criticise it accurately. Some tastes lead us imperceptibly to objects, from which others carry us away by their force or intensity.

Some persons have bad taste in everything, others have bad taste only in some things, but a correct and good taste in matters within their capacity. Some have peculiar taste, which they know to be bad, but which they still follow. Some have a doubtful taste, and let chance decide, their indecision makes them change, and they are affected with pleasure or weariness on their friends' judgment. Others are always prejudiced, they are the slaves of their tastes, which they adhere to in everything. Some know what is good, and are horrified at what is not; their opinions are clear and true, and they find the reason for their taste in their mind and understanding.

Some have a species of instinct (the source of which they are ignorant of), and decide all questions that come before them by its aid, and always decide rightly.

These follow their taste more than their intelligence, because they do not permit their temper and self-love to prevail over their natural discernment. All they do is in harmony, all is in the same spirit. This harmony makes them decide correctly on matters, and form a correct estimate of their value. But speaking generally there are few who have a taste fixed and independent of that of their friends, they follow example and fashion which generally form the standard of taste.

In all the diversities of taste that we discern, it is very rare and almost impossible to meet with that sort of good taste that knows how to set a price on the particular, and yet understands the right value that should be placed on all. Our knowledge is too limited, and that correct discernment of good qualities which goes to form a correct judgment is too seldom to be met with except in regard to matters that do not concern us.

As regards ourselves our taste has not this all-important discernment. Preoccupation, trouble, all that concern us, present it to us in another aspect. We do not see with the same eyes what does and what does not relate to us. Our taste is guided by the bent of our self-love and temper, which supplies us with new views which we adapt to an infinite number of changes and uncertainties. Our taste is no longer our own, we cease to control it, without our consent it changes, and the same objects appear to us in such divers aspects that ultimately we fail to perceive what we have seen and heard.

IV. On Society.

In speaking of society my plan is not to speak of friendship, for, though they have some connection, they are yet very different. The former has more in it of greatness and humility, and the greatest merit of the latter is to resemble the former.

For the present I shall speak of that particular kind of intercourse that gentlemen should have with each other. It would be idle to show how far society is essential to men: all seek for it, and all find it, but few adopt the method of making it pleasant and lasting.

Everyone seeks to find his pleasure and his advantage at the expense of others. We prefer ourselves always to those with whom we intend to live, and they almost always perceive the preference. It is this which disturbs and destroys society. We should discover a means to hide this love of selection since it is too ingrained in us to be in our power to destroy. We should make our pleasure that of other persons, to humour, never to wound their self-love.

The mind has a great part to do in so great a work, but it is not merely sufficient for us to guide it in the different courses it should hold.

The agreement we meet between minds would not keep society together for long if she was not governed and sustained by good sense, temper, and by the consideration which ought to exist between persons who have to live together.

It sometimes happens that persons opposite in temper and mind become united. They doubtless hold together for different reasons, which cannot last for long. Society may subsist between those who are our inferiors by birth or by personal qualities, but those who have these advantages should not abuse them. They should seldom let it be perceived that they serve to instruct others. They should let their conduct show that they, too, have need to be guided and led by reason, and accommodate themselves as far as possible to the feeling and the interests of the others.

To make society pleasant, it is essential that each should retain his freedom of action. A man should not see himself, or he should see himself without dependence, and at the same time amuse himself. He should have the power of separating himself without that separation bringing any change on the society. He should have the power to pass by one and the other, if he does not wish to expose himself to occasional embarrassments; and he should remember that he is often bored when he believes he has not the power even to bore. He should share in what he believes to be the amusement of persons with whom he wishes to live, but he should not always be liable to the trouble of providing them.

Complaisance is essential in society, but it should have its limits, it becomes a slavery when it is extreme. We should so render a free consent, that in following the opinion of our friends they should believe that they follow ours.

We should readily excuse our friends when their faults are born with them, and they are less than their good qualities. We should often avoid to show what they have said, and what they have left unsaid. We should try to make them perceive their faults, so as to give them the merit of correcting them.

There is a kind of politeness which is necessary in the intercourse among gentlemen, it makes them comprehend badinage, and it keeps them from using and employing certain figures of speech, too rude and unrefined, which are often used thoughtlessly when we hold to our opinion with too much warmth.

The intercourse of gentlemen cannot subsist without a certain kind of confidence; this should be equal on both sides. Each should have an appearance of sincerity and of discretion which never causes the fear of anything imprudent being said.

There should be some variety in wit. Those who have only one kind of wit cannot please for long unless they can take different roads, and not both use the same talents, thus adding to the pleasure of society, and keeping the same harmony that different voices and different instruments should observe in music; and as it is detrimental to the quiet of society, that many persons should have the same interests, it is yet as necessary for it that their interests should not be different.

We should anticipate what can please our friends, find out how to be useful to them so as to exempt them from annoyance, and when we cannot avert evils, seem to participate in them, insensibly obliterate without attempting to destroy them at a blow, and place agreeable objects in their place, or at least such as will interest them. We should talk of subjects that concern them, but only so far as they like, and we should take great care where we draw the line. There is a species of politeness, and we may say a similar species of humanity, which does not enter too quickly into the recesses of the heart. It often takes pains to allow us to see all that our friends know, while they have still the advantage of not knowing to the full when we have penetrated the depth of the heart.

Thus the intercourse between gentlemen at once gives them familiarity and furnishes them with an infinite number of subjects on which to talk freely.

Few persons have sufficient tact and good sense fairly to appreciate many matters that are essential to maintain society. We desire to turn away at a certain point, but we do not want to be mixed up in everything, and we fear to know all kinds of truth.

As we should stand at a certain distance to view objects, so we should also stand at a distance to observe society; each has its proper point of view from which it should be regarded. It is quite right that it should not be looked at too closely, for there is hardly a man who in all matters allows himself to be seen as he really is.

V. On Conversation.

The reason why so few persons are agreeable in conversation is that each thinks more of what he desires to say, than of what the others say, and that we make bad listeners when we want to speak.

Yet it is necessary to listen to those who talk, we should give them the time they want, and let them say even senseless things; never contradict or interrupt them; on the contrary, we should enter into their mind and taste, illustrate their meaning, praise anything they say that deserves praise, and let them see we praise more from our choice than from agreement with them.

To please others we should talk on subjects they like and that interest them, avoid disputes upon indifferent matters, seldom ask questions, and never let them see that we pretend to be better informed than they are.

We should talk in a more or less serious manner, and upon more or less abstruse subjects, according to the temper and understanding of the persons we talk with, and readily give them the advantage of deciding without obliging them to answer when they are not anxious to talk.

After having in this way fulfilled the duties of politeness, we can speak our opinions to our listeners when we find an opportunity without a sign of presumption or opinionatedness. Above all things we should avoid often talking of ourselves and giving ourselves as an example; nothing is more tiresome than a man who quotes himself for everything.

We cannot give too great study to find out the manner and the capacity of those with whom we talk, so as to join in the conversation of those who have more than ourselves without hurting by this preference the wishes or interests of others.

Then we should modestly use all the modes abovementioned to show our thoughts to them, and make them, if possible, believe that we take our ideas from them.

We should never say anything with an air of authority, nor show any superiority of mind. We should avoid far-fetched expressions, expressions hard or forced, and never let the words be grander than the matter.

It is not wrong to retain our opinions if they are reasonable, but we should yield to reason, wherever she appears and from whatever side she comes, she alone should govern our opinions, we should follow her without opposing the opinions of others, and without seeming to ignore what they say.

It is dangerous to seek to be always the leader of the conversation, and to push a good argument too hard, when we have found one. Civility often hides half its understanding, and when it meets with an opinionated man who defends the bad side, spares him the disgrace of giving way.

We are sure to displease when we speak too long and too often of one subject, and when we try to turn the conversation upon subjects that we think more instructive than others, we should enter indifferently upon every subject that is agreeable to others, stopping where they wish, and avoiding all they do not agree with.

Every kind of conversation, however witty it may be, is not equally fitted for all clever persons; we should select what is to their taste and suitable to their condition, their sex, their talents, and also choose the time to say it.

We should observe the place, the occasion, the temper in which we find the person who listens to us, for if there is much art in speaking to the purpose, there is no less in knowing when to be silent. There is an eloquent silence which serves to approve or to condemn, there is a silence of discretion and of respect. In a word, there is a tone, an air, a manner, which renders everything in conversation agreeable or disagreeable, refined or vulgar.

But it is given to few persons to keep this secret well. Those who lay down rules too often break them, and the safest we are able to give is to listen much, to speak little, and to say nothing that will ever give ground for regret.

VI. Falsehood.

We are false in different ways. There are some men who are false from wishing always to appear what they are not. There are some who have better faith, who are born false, who deceive themselves, and who never see themselves as they really are; to some is given a true understanding and a false taste, others have a false understanding and some correctness in taste; there are some who have not any falsity either in taste or mind. These last are very rare, for to speak generally, there is no one who has not some falseness in some corner of his mind or his taste.

What makes this falseness so universal, is that as our qualities are uncertain and confused, so too, are our tastes; we do not see things exactly as they are, we value them more or less than they are worth, and do not bring them into unison with ourselves in a manner which suits them or suits our condition or qualities.

This mistake gives rise to an infinite number of falsities in the taste and in the mind. Our self-love is flattered by all that presents itself to us under the guise of good.

But as there are many kinds of good which affect our vanity and our temper, so they are often followed from custom or advantage. We follow because the others follow, without considering that the same feeling ought not to be equally embarrassing to all kinds of persons, and that it should attach itself more or less firmly, according as persons agree more or less with those who follow them.

We dread still more to show falseness in taste than in mind. Gentleness should approve without prejudice what deserves to be approved, follow what deserves to be followed, and take offence at nothing. But there should be great distinction and great accuracy. We should distinguish between what is good in the abstract and what is good for ourselves, and always follow in reason the natural inclination which carries us towards matters that please us.

If men only wished to excel by the help of their own talents, and in following their duty, there would be nothing false in their taste or in their conduct. They would show what they were, they would judge matters by their lights, and they would attract by their reason. There would be a discernment in their views, in their sentiments, their taste would be true, it would come to them direct, and not from others, they would follow from choice and not from habit or chance. If we are false in admiring what should not be admired, it is oftener from envy that we affix a value to qualities which are good in themselves, but which do not become us. A magistrate is false when he flatters himself he is brave, and that he will be able to be bold in certain cases. He should be as firm and stedfast in a plot which ought to be stifled without fear of being false, as he would be false and absurd in fighting a duel about it.

A woman may like science, but all sciences are not suitable for her, and the doctrines of certain sciences never become her, and when applied by her are always false.

We should allow reason and good sense to fix the value of things, they should determine our taste and give things the merit they deserve, and the importance it is fitting we should give them. But nearly all men are deceived in the price and in the value, and in these mistakes there is always a kind of falseness.

VII. On Air and Manner.

There is an air which belongs to the figure and talents of each individual; we always lose it when we abandon it to assume another.

We should try to find out what air is natural to us and never abandon it, but make it as perfect as we can. This is the reason that the majority of children please. It is because they are wrapt up in the air and manner nature has given them, and are ignorant of any other. They are changed and corrupted when they quit infancy, they think they should imitate what they see, and they are not altogether able to imitate it. In this imitation there is always something of falsity and uncertainty. They have nothing settled in their manner and opinions. Instead of being in reality what they want to appear, they seek to appear what they are not.

All men want to be different, and to be greater than they are; they seek for an air other than their own, and a mind different from what they possess; they take their style and manner at chance. They make experiments upon themselves without considering that what suits one person will not suit everyone, that there is no universal rule for taste or manners, and that there are no good copies.

Few men, nevertheless, can have unison in many matters without being a copy of each other, if each follow his natural turn of mind. But in general a person will not wholly follow it. He loves to imitate. We often imitate the same person without perceiving it, and we neglect our own good qualities for the good qualities of others, which generally do not suit us.

I do not pretend, from what I say, that each should so wrap himself up in himself as not to be able to follow example, or to add to his own, useful and serviceable habits, which nature has not given him. Arts and sciences may be proper for the greater part of those who are capable for them. Good manners and politeness are proper for all the world. But, yet acquired qualities should always have a certain agreement and a certain union with our own natural qualities, which they imperceptibly extend and increase. We are elevated to a rank and dignity above ourselves. We are often engaged in a new profession for which nature has not adapted us. All these conditions have each an air which belong to them, but which does not always agree with our natural manner. This change of our fortune often changes our air and our manners, and augments the air of dignity, which is always false when it is too marked, and when it is not united and amalgamated with that which nature has given us. We should unite and blend them together, and thus render them such that they can never be separated.

We should not speak of all subjects in one tone and in the same manner. We do not march at the head of a regiment as we walk on a promenade; and we should use the same style in which we should naturally speak of different things in the same way, with the same difference as we should walk, but always naturally, and as is suitable, either at the head of a regiment or on a promenade. There are some who are not content to abandon the air and manner natural to them to assume those of the rank and dignities to which they have arrived. There are some who assume prematurely the air of the dignities and rank to which they aspire. How many lieutenantgenerals assume to be marshals of France, how many barristers vainly repeat the style of the Chancellor and how many female citizens give themselves the airs of duchesses.

But what we are most often vexed at is that no one knows how to conform his air and manners with his appearance, nor his style and words with his thoughts and sentiments, that every one forgets himself and how far he is insensibly removed from the truth. Nearly every one falls into this fault in some way. No one has an ear sufficiently fine to mark perfectly this kind of cadence.

Thousands of people with good qualities are displeasing; thousands pleasing with far less abilities, and why? Because the first wish to appear to be what they are not, the second are what they appear.

Some of the advantages or disadvantages that we have received from nature please in proportion as we know the air, the style, the manner, the sentiments that coincide with our condition and our appearance, and displease in the proportion they are removed from that point.

INDEX

THE LETTER R PRECEDING A REFERENCE REFERS TO THE REFLECTIONS, THE ROMAN NUMERALS REFER TO THE SUPPLEMENTS.

Ability, 162, 165, 199, 245, 283, 288SEE Cleverness
———, Sovereign, 244
Absence, 276
Accent, country, 342, XCIV
Accidents, 59, 310
Acquaintances, 426SEE FRIENDS.
Acknowledgements, 225
Actions, 1, 7, 57, 58, 160, 161, 382, 409, CXX
Actors, 256
Admiration, 178, 294, 474
Adroitness of mind, R.II
Adversity, 25
———— of Friends, XV
Advice, 110, 116, 283, 378, CXVII
Affairs, 453
Affectation, 134, 493
Affections, 232
Afflictions, 233, 355, 362, 493, XCVII, XV
Age, 222, 405, LXXIIISEE Old Age.
Agreeableness, 255, R.V
Agreement, 240
Air, 399, 495
— Of a Citizen, 393
Ambition, 24, 91, 246, 293, 490
Anger, XXX
Application, 41, 243
Appearances, 64, 166, 199, 256, 302, 431, 457, R.VII
—————, Conformity of Manners with, R. 7.
Applause, 272
Approbation, 51, 280
Artifices, 117, 124, 125, 126, R.II
Astonishment, 384
Avarice, 167, 491, 492.

Ballads, 211
Beauty, 240, 474, 497, LI
——— of the Mind, R.II
Bel esprit defined, R.II
Benefits, 14, 298, 299, 301, CXXII
Benefactors, 96, 317, CXXII
Blame, CVIII
Blindness, XIX
Boasting, 141, 307
Boredom, 141, 304, 352SEE Ennui.
Bouts rimés, 382, CXX
Bravery, 1, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 365,
504SEE Courage and Valour.
Brilliancy of Mind, R.II
Brilliant things, LII.

Capacity, 375
Caprice, 45
Chance, 57, 344, XCVSEE Fortune.
Character, LVI, R.II
Chastity, 1SEE Virtue of Women.
Cheating, 114, 127
Circumstances, 59, 470
Civility, 260
Clemency, 15, 16
Cleverness, 162, 269, 245, 399
Coarseness, 372
Comedy, 211, R.III
Compassion, 463SEE Pity.
Complaisance, 481, R.IV
Conduct, 163, 227, 378, CXVII
Confidants, whom we make, R.I
Confidence, 239, 365, 475, XLIX, R.1, R.IV
Confidence, difference from Sincerity
—————, defined, R.I
Consolation, 325
Constancy, 19, 20, 21, 175, 176, 420
Contempt, 322.
———— of Death, 504
Contentment, LXXX
Contradictions, 478
Conversation, 139, 140, 142, 312, 313, 314, 364, 391,
421, CIV, R.V
Copies, 133
Coquetry, 241SEE Flirtation.
Country Manner, 393
——— Accent, 342
Courage, 1, 214, 215, 216, 219, 221, XLIISEE Bravery.
Covetousness, opposed to Reason, 469
Cowardice, 215, 480
Cowards, 370
Crimes, 183, 465, XXXV, XXXVII
Cunning, 126, 129, 394, 407
Curiosity, 173.

Danger, XLII
Death, 21, 23, 26
——, Contempt of, 504
Deceit, 86, 117, 118, 124, 127, 129, 395, 434SEE ALSO
Self-Deceit.
Deception, CXXI
Decency, 447
Defects, 31, 90, 493, LXXIISEE Faults.
Delicacy, 128, R.II
Dependency, result of Confidence, R.I
Designs, 160, 161
Desires, 439, 469, LXXXII, LXXXV
Despicable Persons, 322
Detail, Mind given to, R.II
Details, 41, 106
Devotion, 427
Devotees, 427
Devout, LXXVI
Differences, 135
Dignities, R.VII
Discretion, R.V
Disguise, 119, 246, 282
Disgrace, 235, 412
Dishonour, 326, LXIX
Distrust, 84, 86, 335
Divination, 425
Doubt, 348
Docility, R.IV
Dupes, 87, 102.

Education, 261
Elevation, 399, 400, 403
Eloquence, 8, 249, 250
Employments, 164, 419, 449
Enemies, 114, 397, 458, 463
Ennui, 122, 141, 304, 312, 352, CXII, R.II
Envy, 27, 28, 280, 281, 328, 376, 433, 476, 486
Epithets assigned to the Mind, R.II
Esteem, 296
Establish, 56, 280
Evils, 121, 197, 269, 454, 464, XCIII
Example, 230
Exchange of secrets, R.I
Experience, 405
Expedients, 287
Expression, refined, R.V.

Faculties of the Mind, 174
Failings, 397, 403
Falseness, R.VI
————, disguised, 282
————, kinds of, R.VI
Familiarity, R.IV
Fame, 157
Farces, men compared to, 211
Faults, 37, 112, 155, 184, 190, 194, 196, 251, 354, 365,
372, 397, 403, 411, 428, 493, 494, V, LXV, CX,
CXV
Favourites, 55
Fear, 370, LXVIII
Feeling, 255
Ferocity, XXXIII
Fickleness, 179, 181, 498
Fidelity, 247
————, hardest test of, R.I
———— in love, 331, 381, C
Figure and air, R.VII
Firmness, 19, 479
Flattery, 123, 144, 152, 198, 320, 329
Flirts, 406, 418
Flirtation, 107, 241, 277, 332, 334, 349, 376, LXIV
Follies, 156, 300, 408, 416
Folly, 207, 208, 209, 210, 231, 300, 310, 311, 318,
XXIV
Fools, 140, 210, 309, 318, 357, 414, 451, 456,
——, old, 444
——, witty, 451, 456
Force of Mind, 30, 42, 237
Forgetfulness, XXVI
Forgiveness, 330
Fortitude, 19SEE Bravery.
Fortune, 1, 17, 45, 52, 53, 58, 60, 61, 154, 212, 227, 323,
343, 380, 391, 392, 399, 403, 435, 449, IX. , CXIX
Friends, 84, 114, 179, 235, 279, 315, 319, 428
———, adversity of, XV
———, disgrace of, 235
———, faults of, 428
———, true ones, LXXXVI
Friendship, 80, 81, 83, 376, 410, 427, 440, 441, 473,
XXII, CXXIV
—————, defined, 83
—————, women do not care for, 440
—————, rarer than love, 473
Funerals, XXXVIII.

Gallantry, 100SEE Flirtation.
———— of mind, 100
Generosity, 246
Genius, R.II
Gentleness, R.VI
Ghosts, 76
Gifts of the mind, R.II
Glory, 157, 198, 221, 268
Good, 121, 185, 229, 238, 303, XCIII
——, how to be, XLVII
Goodness, 237, 275, 284, XLVI
Good grace, 67, R.VII
Good man, who is a, 206
God nature, 481
Good qualities, 29, 90, 337, 365, 397, 462
Good sense, 67, 347, CVI
Good taste, 258
—————, rarity of, R.III
——, women, 368, XCVI
Government of others, 151
Grace, 67
Gracefulness, 240
Gratitude, 223, 224, 225, 279, 298, 438, XLIII
Gravity, 257
Great men, what they cannot acquire, LXXXIV
Great minds, 142
Great names, 94
Greediness, 66.

Habit, 426
Happy, who are, 49
Happiness, 48, 61, VII, LXXX, LXXXI
hatred, 338
Head, 102, 108
Health, 188, LVII
Heart, 98, 102, 103, 108, 478, 484
Heroes, 24, 53, 185
Honesty, 202, 206
Honour, 270
Hope, 168, LXVIII
Humility, 254, 358, LXXVI, LXXIX
Humiliation, 272
Humour, 47SEE Temper.
Hypocrisy, 218
———— of afflictions, 233.

Idleness, 169, 266, 267, 398, 482, 487, XVIII. , LV
Ills, 174SEE Evils.
Illusions, 123
Imagination, 478
Imitation, 230, XLIV, R.V
Impertinence, 502
Impossibilities, 30
Incapacity, 126
Inclination, 253, 390
Inconsistency, 135
Inconstancy, 181
Inconvenience, 242
Indifference, 172, XXIII
Indiscretion, 429
Indolence. SEE Idleness, and Laziness.
Infidelity, 359, 360, 381, 429
Ingratitude, 96, 226, 306, 317
Injuries, 14
Injustice, 78
Innocence, 465
Instinct, 123
Integrity, 170
Interest, 39, 40, 66, 85, 172, 187, 232, 253, 305, 390
Interests, 66
Intrepidity, 217, XL
Intrigue, 73
Invention, 287.

Jealousy, 28, 32, 324, 336, 359, 361, 446, 503, CII
Joy, XIV
Judges, 268
Judgment, 89, 97, 248
———— of the World, 212, 455
Justice, 78, 458, XII.

Kindness, 14, 85
Knowledge, 106.

Labour of Body, effect of, LXXVII
Laments, 355
Laziness, 367SEE Idleness.
Leader, 43
Levity, 179, 181
Liberality, 167, 263
Liberty in Society, R.IV
Limits to Confidence, R.I
Little Minds, 142
Love, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 136, 259, 262,
274, 286, 296, 321, 335, 336, 348, 349, 351, 353,
361, 371, 374, 385, 395, 396, 402, 417, 418, 422,
430, 440, 441, 459, 466, 471, 473, 499, 500, 501,
X, XI, XIII, LVIII, LX, LXII, LXXXVIII,
XCIX, CIII, CXXI
—— defined, 68
——, Coldness in, LX
——, Effect of absence on, 276
—— akin to Hate, 111
—— of Women, 466, 471, 499
——, Novelty in, 274
——, Infidelity in, LXIV
——, Old age of, 430
——, Cure for, 417, 459
Loss of Friends, XLV
Lovers, 312, 362, LXXXVII, XCVII
Lunatic, 353
Luxury, LIV
Lying, 63.

Madmen, 353, 414
Malady, LVII
Magistrates, R.VI
Magnanimity, 248, LIII
————— defined, 285
Malice, 483
Manners, R.VII
Mankind, 436, XXXVI
Marriages, 113
Maxims, LXVII
Mediocrity, 375
Memory, 89, 313
Men easier to know than Man, 436
Merit, 50, 92, 95, 153, 156, 165, 166, 273, 291, 379,
401, 437, 455, CXVIII
Mind, 101, 103, 265, 357, 448, 482, CIX
Mind, Capacities of, R.II
Miserable, 49
Misfortunes, 19, 24, 174, 325
————— of Friends. XV
————— of Enemies, 463
Mistaken people, 386
Mistrust, 86
Mockery, R.II
Moderation, 17, 18, 293, 308, III, IV
Money, Man compared to, XXXII
Motives, 409.

Names, Great, 94
Natural goodness, 275
Natural, to be, 431
———, always pleasing, R.VII
Nature, 53, 153, 189, 365, 404
Negotiations, 278
Novelty in study, 178
——— in love, 274
——— in friendship, 426.

Obligations, 299, 317, 438SEE Benefits and Gratitude.
Obstinacy, 234, 424
———— its cause, 265
Occasions. SEE Opportunities.
Old Age, 109, 210, 418, 423, 430, 461
Old Men, 93
Openness of heart, R. 1.
Opinions, 13, 234, CXXIII, R.V
Opinionatedness, R.V
Opportunities, 345, 453, CV.

Passions, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 122, 188, 266, 276, 404,
422, 443, 460, 471, 477, 484, 485, 486, 500, II
Peace of Mind, VIII
Penetration, 377, 425, CXVI
Perfection, R.II
Perseverance, 177
Perspective, 104
Persuasion, 8
Philosophers, 46, 54, 504, XXI
Philosophy, 22
————— of a Footman, 504, LXXV
Pity, 264
Pleasing, 413, CXXV
————, Mode of, XLVIII, R.V
————, Mind a, R.II
Point of view, R.IV
Politeness, 372, R.V
Politeness of Mind, 99
Praise, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 272, 356,
432, XXVII, CVII
Preoccupation, 92, R.III
Pride, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 228, 234, 239, 254, 267, 281,
450, 462, 463, 472, VI, XIX
Princes, 15, 320
Proceedings, 170
Productions of the Mind, R.II
Professions, 256
Promises, 38
Proportion, R.VI
Propriety, 447
———— in Women, XXXIV
Prosperity, 25
Providence, XXXIX
Prudence, 65, LXXXVIII, R.I.

Qualities, 29, 162, 397, 470, 498, R.VI, R.VII
————, Bad, 468
————, Good, 88, 337, 462
————, Great, 159, 433
————, of Mind, classified, R.II
Quarrels, 496,
Quoting oneself, R.V.

Raillery, R.II, R.IV
Rank, 401
Reason, 42, 105, 325, 365, 467, 469, XX, R.VI
Recollection in Memory{, 313}.
Reconciliation, 82
Refinement, R.II
Regret, 355
Relapses, 193
Remedies, 288
———— for love 459
Remonstrances, 37
Repentance, 180
Repose, 268
Reproaches, 148
Reputation, 268, 412
Resolution, L
Revenge, 14
Riches, 54
Ridicule, 133, 134, 326, 418, 422
Rules for Conversation, R.V
Rusticity, 393.

Satire, 483, R.II, R.IV
Sciences, R.VI
Secrets, XVI, R.I
———, How they should be kept, R.I
Self-deceit, 115, 452.
Self-love, 2, 3, 4, 228, 236, 247, 261, 262, 339, 494, 500,
I, XVII, XXVIII, XXXIII, LXVI, LXXIV
———— in love, 262
Self-satisfaction, 51
Sensibility, 275
Sensible People, 347, CVI
Sentiment, 255, R.VI
Severity of Women, 204, 333
Shame, 213, 220
Silence, 79, 137, 138, CXIV
Silliness. SEE Folly.
Simplicity, 289
Sincerity, 62, 316, 366, 383, 457
————, Difference between it and Confidence, R.I
————, defined, R.I
———— of Lovers, LXI
Skill, LXIV
Sobriety, XXV
Society, 87, 201, R.IV
———, Distinction between it and Friendship, R.IV
Soul, 80, 188, 194
Souls, Great, XXXI
Sorrows, LXXVIII
Stages of Life, 405
Strength of mind, 19, 20, 21, 504
Studies, why new ones are pleasing, 178
———, what to study, XCII
Subtilty, 128
Sun, 26.

Talents, 468
———, latent, 344, XCV
Talkativeness, 314
Taste, 13, 109, 252, 390, 467, CXX, R.III, R.VI
——, good, 258, R.III
——, cause of diversities in, R.III
——, false, R.III
Tears, 233, 373
Temper, 47, 290, 292
Temperament, 220, 222, 297, 346
Times for speaking, R.V
Timidity, 169, 480
Titles, XXXII
Tranquillity, 488
Treachery, 120, 126
Treason, 120
Trickery, 86, 350, XCISEE Deceit.
Trifles, 41
Truth, 64, LI
Tyranny, R.I.

Understanding, 89
Untruth, 63SEE Lying.
Unhappy, CXXV.

Valour, 1, 213, 214, 215, 216SEE Bravery and Courage.
Vanity, 137, 158, 200, 232, 388, 389, 443, 467, 483
Variety of mind, R.IV
Vice, 182, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 195, 218, 253, 273,
380, 442, 445, XXIX
Violence, 363, 369, 466, CXIII
Victory, XII
Virtue, 1, 25, 169, 171, 182, 186, 187, 189, 200, 218,
253, 380, 388, 442, 445, 489, XXIX
Virtue of Women, 1, 220, 367, XCVIII
Vivacity, 416.

Weakness, 130, 445
Wealth, Contempt of, 301
Weariness. SEE Ennui.
Wicked people, 284
Wife jealous sometimes desirable, LXXXIX
Will, 30
Wisdom, 132, 210, 231, 323, 444, LXXXIII
Wise Man, who is a, 203, XCI
Wishes, 295
Wit, 199, 340, 413, 415, 421, 502
Wives, 364, CIV
Woman, 131, 204, 205, 220, 241, 277, 332, 333, 334,
340, 346, 362, 367, 368, 418, 429, 440, 466, 471,
474, LXX, XC
Women, Severity of, 333
——, Virtue of, 205, 220, XC
——, Power of, LXXI
Wonder, 384
World, 201
——, Judgment of, 268
——, Approbation of, 201
——, Establishment in, 56
——, Praise and censure of, 454.

Young men, 378, 495
Youth, 271, 341.