Kant's Critique of Judgement
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CONTENTS
| PAGE | ||
| Editor’s Introduction | xi | |
| Preface | 1 | |
| Introduction | 7 | |
| I. | Of the division of Philosophy | 7 |
| II. | Of the realm of Philosophy in general | 11 |
| III. | Of the Critique of Judgement as a means of combining the two parts of Philosophy into a whole | 14 |
| IV. | Of Judgement as a faculty legislating a priori | 17 |
| V. | The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of Judgement | 20 |
| VI. | Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature | 27 |
| VII. | Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of nature | 30 |
| VIII. | Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature | 35 |
| IX. | Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with that of Reason by means of the Judgement | 39 |
| First Part.—Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement | 43 | |
| First Division.—Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement | 45 | |
| First Book.—Analytic of the Beautiful | 45 | |
| First Moment of the judgement of taste, according to quality | 45 | |
| § 1. | The judgement of taste is aesthetical | 45 |
| § 2. | The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested | 46 |
| § 3. | The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest | 48 |
| § 4. | The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest | 50 |
| § 5. | Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction | 53 |
| Second Moment of the judgement of taste, viz. according to quantity | 55 | |
| § 6. | The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction | 55 |
| § 7. | Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic | 57 |
| § 8. | The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of Taste only as subjective | 59 |
| § 9. | Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object | 63 |
| Third Moment of judgements of taste according to the relation of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein | 67 | |
| § 10. | Of purposiveness in general | 67 |
| § 11. | The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation) | 69 |
| § 12. | The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds | 70 |
| § 13. | The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion | 72 |
| § 14. | Elucidation by means of examples | 73 |
| § 15. | The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection | 77 |
| § 16. | The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure | 81 |
| § 17. | Of the Ideal of Beauty | 84 |
| Fourth Moment of the judgement of taste, according to the modality of the satisfaction in the object | 91 | |
| § 18. | What the modality in a judgement of taste is | 91 |
| § 19. | The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the judgement of taste is conditioned | 92 |
| § 20. | The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense | 92 |
| § 21. | Have we ground for presupposing a common sense? | 93 |
| § 22. | The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense | 94 |
| General remark on the first section of the Analytic | 96 | |
| Second Book.—Analytic of the Sublime | 101 | |
| § 23. | Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime | 101 |
| § 24. | Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the Sublime | 105 |
| A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime | 106 | |
| § 25. | Explanation of the term “Sublime” | 106 |
| § 26. | Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime | 110 |
| § 27. | Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime | 119 |
| B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature | 123 | |
| § 28. | Of Nature regarded as Might | 123 |
| § 29. | Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature | 130 |
| General remark upon the exposition of the aesthetical reflective Judgement | 132 | |
| Deduction of [pure] aesthetical judgements | 150 | |
| § 30. | The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful | 150 |
| § 31. | Of the method of deduction of judgements of taste | 152 |
| § 32. | First peculiarity of the judgement of taste | 154 |
| § 33. | Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste | 157 |
| § 34. | There is no objective principle of taste possible | 159 |
| § 35. | The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in general | 161 |
| § 36. | Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste | 162 |
| § 37. | What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste | 164 |
| § 38. | Deduction of judgements of taste | 165 |
| § 39. | Of the communicability of a sensation | 167 |
| § 40. | Of taste as a kind of sensus communis | 169 |
| § 41. | Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful | 173 |
| § 42. | Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful | 176 |
| § 43. | Of Art in general | 183 |
| § 44. | Of beautiful Art | 185 |
| § 45. | Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature | 187 |
| § 46. | Beautiful art is the art of genius | 188 |
| § 47. | Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius | 190 |
| § 48. | Of the relation of Genius to Taste | 193 |
| § 49. | Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius | 197 |
| § 50. | Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful Art | 205 |
| § 51. | Of the division of the beautiful arts | 206 |
| § 52. | Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product | 214 |
| § 53. | Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts | 215 |
| § 54. | Remark | 220 |
| Second Division.—Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgement | 229 | |
| § 55. | 229 | |
| § 56. | Representation of the antinomy of Taste | 230 |
| § 57. | Solution of the antinomy of Taste | 231 |
| § 58. | Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement | 241 |
| § 59. | Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality | 248 |
| § 60. | Appendix:—Of the method of Taste | 253 |
| Second Part.—Critique of the Teleological Judgement | 257 | |
| § 61. | Of the objective purposiveness of Nature | 259 |
| First Division.—Analytic of the Teleological Judgement | 262 | |
| § 62. | Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished from that which is material | 262 |
| § 63. | Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of nature | 268 |
| § 64. | Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes | 272 |
| § 65. | Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings | 275 |
| § 66. | Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised beings | 280 |
| § 67. | Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of purposes | 282 |
| § 68. | Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science | 287 |
| Second Division.—Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement | 292 | |
| § 69. | What is an antinomy of the Judgement? | 292 |
| § 70. | Representation of this antinomy | 293 |
| § 71. | Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy | 296 |
| § 72. | Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of Nature | 298 |
| § 73. | None of the above systems give what they pretend | 302 |
| § 74. | The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable | 306 |
| § 75. | The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement | 309 |
| § 76. | Remark | 313 |
| § 77. | Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural purpose is possible | 319 |
| § 78. | Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature | 326 |
| Appendix.—Methodology of the Teleological Judgement | 334 | |
| § 79. | Whether Teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of nature | 334 |
| § 80. | Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose | 336 |
| § 81. | Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product | 342 |
| § 82. | Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised beings | 346 |
| § 83. | Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system | 352 |
| § 84. | Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself | 359 |
| § 85. | Of Physico-theology | 362 |
| § 86. | Of Ethico-theology | 370 |
| § 87. | Of the moral proof of the Being of God | 377 |
| § 88. | Limitation of the validity of the moral proof | 384 |
| § 89. | Of the use of the moral argument | 392 |
| § 90. | Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God | 395 |
| § 91. | Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith | 403 |
| General remark on Teleology | 414 | |